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Going-private transactions have become increasingly popular as
corporations weary of wearing public smiles have sought the relative
seclusion of private corporate existence. Basically, reversion to private
status is accomplished by reducing the number of shareholders in the
corporation to less than 300, thereby enabling the corporation to deregis-
ter with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) under section 12
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act).1 Because the
going-private transaction necessarily involves elimination of the minority
shareholders from the corporation, its rise in popularity has been accom-
panied by a growing judicial concern for the rights of the ousted minority
shareholders.2
Two divergent approaches have emerged to provide protection for the
eliminated minority shareholders. The valuation approach,3 embodied in
the appraisal statutes, 4 maintains that the shareholder's right in going-
private transactions lies exclusively in the value of his investment. The
second approach is rising in popularity. Based on a property conception
of shareholder rights, 5 this approach gives the shareholder the right to
remain within the corporation.6 The right to remain within the corpora-
tion, however, is not considered absolute and may be overridden under
certain conditions, for instance, if the majority can demonstrate either a
valid business purpose for the transaction or the entire fairness of the
transaction.
1. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(g)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(4) (1970).
2. See, e.g., Berkowitz v. Power/Mate Corp., 135 N.J. Super. 35, 342 A.2d 566 (Super.
Ct. 1975); Tanzer Economic Assocs. v. Universal Food Specialities, Inc., 87 Misc. 2d 167,
383 N.Y.S.2d 472 (1976). See also note 67 infra.
3. The term "valuation approach" is used here for convenience. Cases utilizing the
valuation approach include: Grimes v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 392 F. Supp.
1393 (N.D. Fla. 1974) (applying Delaware law); David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Indus.,
281 A.2d 30 (Del. Ch. 1971); Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 178 A.2d 311 (Del. Ch.),
aff'd, 187 A.2d 78 (Del. 1962).
4. See, e.g., DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 262 (Supp. 1976).
5. See notes 214-34 infra and accompanying text.
6. Id.
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Delaware has recently joined in this trend toward the development of
minority shareholder protections which extend beyond providing fair
value for the minority's shares and which may be termed "extra-valua-
tion'protections." In Singer v. Magnavox Co.7 the Delaware Supreme
Court adopted a business purpose test and a fairness hearing for going-
private transactions.
Extra-valuation protections in going-private transactions allow the
minority shareholder to enjoin or void the transaction which, if consum-
mated, would result in his elimination from the on-going enterprise.8 In
effect, such protections give the shareholder a contingent right of
continued participation within the corporation. 9 The recognition of a right
of continued participation necessarily results in an increase in sharehold-
er litigation, t0 a delay in the consummation of business transactions
requiring expedition," and an impairment of the majority shareholders'
voting rights. 1 2 Thus, the validity of extra-valuation protections warrants
careful examination. It should be noted at the outset that although extra-
valuation protections are intended to achieve a balance between the
competing interests of the minority and majority shareholders, 3 such a
balance is very difficult to achieve. Either the majority vote approving
the transaction is given effect immediately or it is subject to judicial
scrutiny. Conversely, either the minority must abide by the decision
approved by the majority14 and authorized by statute 5 or the minority is
given the power to at least delay16 and at most veto17 the transaction.
In the rush to protect the over-powered minority, the majority share-
holder's rights have been neglected. Should the minority prevail in
obtaining injunctive relief, the corporation must remain public. The
7. 380 A.2d 69 (Del. 1977).
8. See, e.g., Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 844 (1974); Albright v. Bergendahl, 391 F. Supp. 754 (D.C. Utah 1974); Singer v.
Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977); Berkowitz v. Power/Mate Corp., 135 N.J.
Super. 35, 342 A.2d 566 (Super. Ct. 1975).
9. See note 208 infra and accompanying text.
10. See, e.g., text accompanying note 185 infra.
11. Gibson, How Fixed Are Class Shareholder Rights?, 23 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 283,
285 (1958).
12. See notes 236-41 infra and accompanying text.
13. See Comment, The Second Circuit Adopts a Business Purpose Test for Going
Private: Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp. and Green v. Santa Fe Industries, Inc., 64 CALIF.
L. REV. 1184, 1208 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Second Circuit].
14. See notes 238-39 infra and accompanying text.
15. Id.
16. The minority may delay the consummation of the transaction simply by bringing
suit.
17. If the minority prevails in obtaining an injunction or voidance of the merger, they
have effectively overridden the majority's vote.
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majority shareholder would thus be bound by a judicially imposed "busi-
ness judgment" which may be questionable. Moreover, the option of
withdrawing his investment from the corporation may be fraught with
difficulties. For unless his stock is sold in one transaction, the inundation
of the market with his large holdings may deflate the value of his shares.
Nor may this deflation in market price be alleviated through an appraisal
proceeding, since this remedy, which assures fair value to disgruntled
minority shareholders in merger transactions, is not available to the
majority shareholder whose merger transaction has been thwarted. I"
Even if the majority shareholder is able to sell his holdings for a
satisfactory price, he may find himself liable under the insider trading
provisions of section 16(b) of the Exchange Act.19
Aside from the failure to take into account these undesirable conse-
quences, the critical flaw in the reasoning behind extra-valuation protec-
tions is that the nature of the shareholder's interest to be terminated is
essentially economic2° and, as such, may be compensated by fair valua-
tion. Thus, there is simply no justification for the provision of injunctive
relief.
Following an examination of the methods and motivations for the
current prevalence of going-private transactions, this comment will focus
critically on the recent rejection of the valuation approach and the
concomitant adoption of extra-valuation protection for minority share-
holders by the Delaware Supreme Court in Singer. The emphasis will be
on the circular reasoning used by the Singer court in order to adopt
extra-valuation protections which are inconsistent with legislative intent,
case precedents, and policy considerations, as well as the factual uni-
quities of the case. Finally, it will be argued that because extra-valuation
protections (1) do not reflect the nature of the shareholder's interest in the
corporation, (2) infringe upon shareholder democracy tenets, and (3)
impede corporate flexibility, they should be rejected. Instead, the remedy
for the eliminated minority shareholders in going-private transactions
should be limited to fair valuation of their stock.
II. METHODS AND MOTIVATION
A. Going-Private Transactions Utilizing the Merger Technique
Mergers which result in the involuntary elimination of the minority
shareholders' interests in the corporation are characterized as freeze-outs
18. See, e.g., DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 262 (Supp. 1976).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1970).
20. See notes 224-26 infra and accompanying text.
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or squeeze-outs. 21 They are typically accomplished in the following
manner: first, the majority shareholders transfer all of their stock in the
target company 22 to a "shell" corporation 23 in exchange for 100% of the
"shell" corporation's stock; second, the target company is merged into
the shell corporation with the remaining public shareholders of the target
company receiving cash or newly created debt securities24 in exchange
for their interest in the merged company.
Frequently, the merger is preceded by a tender offer through which the
majority shareholders acquire a substantial percentage of the outstanding
shares of the target company. Although all mergers require approval by
the board of directors, 25 the necessity of shareholder approval is depen-
dent upon the percentage of outstanding shares the majority shareholders
have acquired. In Delaware, the short-form merger dispenses with the
requirement of shareholder approval where the majority shareholders
have acquired ninety percent or more of the target company's outstanding
stock. 26 Absent ninety percent ownership, the Delaware long-form mer-
ger statute requires approval by a majority of the outstanding shares.27
Thus, if the majority shareholders have acquired more than a majority but
less than ninety percent of the outstanding shares, as a practical matter
they may assure the success of the long-form merger by simply casting
their votes in its favor.
21. Squeeze-outs and freeze-outs are, of course, pejorative terms which bespeak
wrongful exclusion. The taint associated with them is reinforced in the going-private
area by the notions that there is something wrong in reversing direction when one
already has enjoyed the fruits of public funding and that it is particularly invidious to
use the equity attributable to the public to repurchase the public's shares for the
benefit of those in control.
Borden, Going Private-Old Tort, New Tort or No Tort?, 49 N.Y.U.L. REv. 987, 988-89
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Borden].
22. The target company is the company whose existence terminates upon consumma-
tion of the merger, i.e., the company from which the minority is eliminated.
23. For purposes of this comment, a "shell" corporation is a corporation which is
created solely for effectuating the merger transaction.
24. For example, Delaware permits cash or securities of another company to be issued
in exchange for shares of the target company in both the long-form and the short-form
merger. DEL. CODE tit. 8, §§ 251, 253 (1974 & Supp. 1977).
25. Id.
26. Id. § 253. The Delaware short-form merger statute provides that if 90% of the
outstanding stock is owned by the majority, the merger may be effectuated simply by a
resolution of the board of directors.
27. Id. § 251. The Delaware long-form merger statute requires approval by the majority
of shareholders as well as approval by the board of directors. One commentator noted that
where cash is authorized under both the long-form and the short-form merger statute (as in
Delaware, see note 24 supra and accompanying text) the primary distinction between the
two merger statutes is merely that the long-form merger statute requires observance of
"more cumbersome procedural formalities." Fillman, Cash and Property as Con-
sideration in a Merger or Consolidation, 62 Nw. U.L. REV. 837, 852 (1968).
[Vol. I11
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B. Reasons for Going Private
The most apparent benefits inuring to those corporations which revert
to a privately held status flow directly from the elimination of the
minority shareholders. By reducing the number of shareholders to less
than 300,28 and delisting from a stock exchange,2 9 the corporation is no
longer subject to the reporting and disclosure obligations of sections 1230
and 13(a)-(c)31 of the Exchange Act. Compliance with subsections 13(d)
and (e), requiring the registration of beneficial owners of five percent or
more of the issuer's stock, is no longer mandated.32 Similarly, the insider
trading and reporting restrictions of section 16 33 as well as the proxy and
tender offer requirements of section 1434 are avoided.
The corporation's benefits from circumventing compliance with the
federal provisions are three-fold: (1) exemption from the expense of
compliance; 36 (2) freedom from disclosure of previously confidential
information; and (3) reduced exposure to protracted litigation. However,
the benefits derived from the reduction of federal controls have been
criticized as not justifying a decision to go private. 37 It has been argued
that the expense-saving factor lacks merit since Congress in enacting
these controls deemed public investor protection more important than the
cost of compliance.38 Still, it seems clear that Congress not only limited
the initial imposition of the federal controls to companies with more than
500 shareholders, 39 but also contemplated that those companies might
28. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(g)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(4) (1970).
29. Id. § 12(d), 15 U.S.C. § 781(d).
The New York Stock Exchange provides for delisting if the corporation has fewer than
600,000 publicly held shares, less than 1200 shareholders with blocks of 100 or more
shares, or a total market value of publicly held shares below $5,000,000. NYSE Rule 499, 2
NYSE GUIDE (CCH) 4235-36 (1976).
30. 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1970).
31. Id. § 78m(a)-(c).
32. Id. § 78m(d), (e).
33. Id. § 78p.
34. Id. § 78n.
35. It should be noted that section 10(b) of the Exchange Act is still applicable to
private corporations. Id. § 78j(b).
36. One commentator estimated that a company may save as much as $100,000 per year
by eliminating disclosure costs. Hershman, "Going Pfrivate"-Or How to Squeeze Inves-
tors, DUN'S REV., Jan. 1975, at 37.
37. Second Circuit, supra note 13, at 1211; Comment, "Going Private": Establishing
Federal Standards for the Forced Elimination of Public Investors, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 638,
658 [hereinafter cited as Establishing Federal Standards].
38. Second Circuit, supra note 13, at 1211.
39. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(a), 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1970) requires registration
if the issuer has "total assets exceeding $1,000,000 and a class of equity security. . . held
1978]
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subsequently avoid compliance with the federal provisions by reducing
the number of shareholders to less than 300.40 The loss of a public market
for the companies' stock when there are less than 300 shareholders
diminishes the national interest in regulating these corporations.
41
A similar criticism is that any benefit derived from reduced exposure
to litigation does not flow to the corporation, but to the directors who
"may mulct the corporation unhampered by outside review. "42 Such
reasoning, however, ignores the fact that the directors of private corpora-
tions are still accountable for their actions under state law for breach of
fiduciary duty.43 Additionally, insofar as the corporation usually in-
demnifies its officers and directors for liabilities incurred in non-deriva-
tive suits arising from the good faith performance of their corporate
duties, the benefit of reduced exposure to litigation does directly accrue
to the corporation. Moreover, the ever-expanding sphere of liability of
the modern corporation, 4 along with the growing litigiousness of share-
holders,45 has augmented the corporation's need to limit the risk of
litigation.
of record by five hundred or more. . . persons," id., or has a security which is traded on
a national exchange, id. § 12(g)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(1).
40. Id. § 12(g)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(4).
41. Section 2 of the Exchange Act provides:
[T]ransactions in securities as commonly conducted upon securities exchanges and
over-the-counter markets are affected with a national public interest which makes it
necessary to provide for regulation . . . of such transactions . . . in order to protect
interstate commerce. . . and to insure the maintenance in such transactions ....
Id. § 78b (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
42. Second Circuit, supra note 13, at 1209 n.105.
43. See, e.g., Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93, 108-09, 460 P.2d 464, 471-
72, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592, 599-600 (1969).
44. Borden notes:
It is easy enough to dismiss these fears on the ground that all management must do to
avoid liability is to obey the law. However, it is terribly difficult to know what the law
is and even more difficult to predict what it will be at the time the propriety of a
particular transaction may be adjudicated.
Borden, supra note 21, at 1014 (footnote omitted).
45. Although no reader of the Wall Street Journal could be unaware of the enormous
number and amount of such claims, it is not surprising, in view of the magnitude of the
claims and reasonable desire of plaintiff's counsel to achieve a prudent risk-reward ratio,
that few cases have gone to judgment. Borden, supra note 21, at 1012 n.121. One court
recognized the desirability of eliminating potential plaintiffs from the corporation:
Possibly statutory provision should be made whereby very small corporate
minorities could be bought out at a fair price fixed by appraisal, arbitration or court
finding, so that shakedown or strike suits could be avoided, and potentially
troublesome small shareholders could be properly compensated for their holdings and
the majority enabled thereby to remove the present handicap to free exercise of
judgment in management.
Cathedral Estates v. Taft Realty Corp., 157 F. Supp. 895, 897 (D. Conn. 1954), aff'd, 228
F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1955).
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In contrast, disclosure requirements are by now so routine that they
have obtained a deceptively innocuous aura. Yet, as Arthur Borden has
observed:
The mandated disclosure of such straitened circumstances as "de-
creased flow of collections from sales to customers, the availability
or lack of availability of credit from suppliers, banks, and other
financial institutions, and the inability to meet maturing obligations
when they fall due" may not have a significant market impact if, as
is usually the case, the security is already severely depressed. How-
ever, it could well convert a voyage on rough but navigable econom-
ic seas into a Poseidon adventure by its impact on vendors, custom-
ers and creditors. 46
For some companies the decision to go private reflects a desire to sever
the company's business decisions and performance from the public
market indices of success .4' With the elimination of the public sharehold-
ers, the company need not be concerned with raising its earnings per
share to instill investor confidence. Instead, the company is freer to make
long-range growth decisions.48
Of course, the degree of the company's dependence upon future
outside capital may be dispositive in determining whether the company
should go private.49 It has been suggested that only corporations which
are small or medium in size can realistically consider going-private, as
the large corporation is far too dependent upon public financing. 0
46. Borden, supra note 21, at 1011 (quoting SEC Securities Act Release No. 5092 [1970-
1971 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 77,915 (Oct. 15, 1970)).
47. Solomon, Going Private: Business Practices, Legal Mechanics, Judicial Standards
and Proposals for Reform, 25 BUFFALO L. REv. 141, 145 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Solomon].
48. As one commentator concluded: "[Tihe company's management and owners spare
themselves from bothersome shareholders. Their salaries and perquisites no longer are a
matter of public concern. They end the pressure to squeeze out quarter-to-quarter earn-
ings gains and can focus instead on long-range plans." Freeman, -Going Private, Wall St.
J., Oct. 18, 1974, at 21, col. 3. See also Borden, supra note 21, at 1007; Establishing
Federal Standards, supra note 37, at 640.
49. Solomon, supra note 47, at 142.
50. Borden, supra note 21, at 1002-03. Borden concludes that the smaller companies
should be allowed to go private since no public benefit is derived by prohibiting such
companies from doing so. Id. Another commentator typified the companies which go
private as follows:
Moreover, those involved were generally among the smallest of our public corpora-
tions, and the liquidity of the public markets for their securities generally ranged from
meager to almost nonexistent, undermining the reliability of those markets as pricing
mechanisms. In many cases there was little likelihood, at any time in the near future,
of being able to further take advantage of the public markets to fill financing needs,
and the costs of remaining public sometimes equalled substantial fractions of net
profits, seriously affecting securities values.
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To some extent the trend toward going private is undoubtedly attribut-
able to depressed stock market conditions."1 The depressed price of stock
has not only made reacquisition of an issuer's outstanding shares a
relatively inexpensive proposition, 2 but has also deflated the currency
value 3 of stock. Many companies went public during the 1960's when
issues selling at 50, 60, or 100 times earnings 4 resulted in a supercurren-
cy valuation of stock which make the use of such stock for employee
stock option programs and corporate acquisitions more appealing. In
contrast, two-thirds of the new issues marketed during the last four years
are selling for less than their initial offering price, and many issues are
currently selling for as low as six, seven, or eight times earnings.55 This
decline in the stock market, with the accompanying devaluation of stock,
has made a market-centered valuation of stock less attractive. 56 Moreov-
er, the option of going private, with the concomitant availability of book
SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 389, at B-4 (Feb. 9, 1977). See also Solomon, supra note
47, at 174-75.
51. By the end of 1977, the Dow Jones average had fallen 19% below its 1976 New
Year's Eve level. TIME, Dec. 19, 1977, at 82. Not surprisingly, inflation is the most
frequently enunciated cause of the market's slump. Id. See also id., Aug. 29, 1977, at 45.
A comparison of the Dow Jones average of about 850 in August, with the August's
average discounted for inflation of 443, illuminates the effect of inflation on the market.
Id. at 44-45. The extent of the market's malaise is further exemplified by the decline in the
percentage of total dollars attributable to individual trading on the New York Stock
Exchange, which fell from 46.1% in 1961 to 23.1% in 1977. Id. at 45.
52. This prospect of buying the public shareholders out when the market price is low
has been severely criticized. One commentator noted: "To allow the corporation to regain
at the expense of public investors what it voluntarily sold on the market is to give the
corporation a 'no lose' option-go public when the market is up, and if it goes down,
freeze out at a bargain price." Second Circuit, supra note 13, at 1214. While none of the
critics has suggested banning going-private transactions when the market is low and
allowing them when the market is high, the fear seems to be that if going-private transac-
tions are not subject to careful scrutiny by the courts, going-public/going-private transac-
tions will become mere echoes of vacillating stock market conditions at the expense of
public shareholders. In response to this possibility one commentator suggested offering
"warrants" to the eliminated public shareholders. These warrants would enable these
shareholders to buy back into the corporation for the same price at which they were
eliminated, should the corporation decide to re-enter the public market within a specified
period of time. Note, Going Private, 84 YALE L.J. 903, 929 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Going Private].
Although the possibility of speculative abuse does exist, it is important to realize that
the companies that went public during the 1960's were not trying to capitalize on the
subsequent bear market, but instead, believed that the market growth existing at the time
would perpetuate itself. TIME, Aug. 29, 1977, at 45.
53. Stock may be used as currency by corporations for acquisitions and as an aid in the
retention of key employees through stock option programs. Going Private, supra note 52,
at 908-09.
54. TiME, Dec. 19, 1977, at 82.
55. Id.
56. Solomon, supra note 47, at 143-45; Going Private, supra note 52, at 908-09.
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value rather than market value as an index of stock valuation,5 7 becomes
more enticing when the depressed stock value is accompanied by an
increase in the company's book value.58 With the currency value of the
company's stock rejuvenated, stock option programs provide greater
incentive, 59 corporate acquisitions using stock as consideration become
more feasible, 60 and creditor skepticism induced by declining stock
market prices is dispelled.6'
Finally, it is important to note that the depressed stock prices create
ideal conditions for the acquisition of such stock by both the issuer and
outside raiders.62 A corporation can most effectively thwart such take-
over threats by using its available liquid assets to acquire another smaller
company63 or by going private. 
64
I. JUDICIAL RESPONSE
Issues of substantive fairness, clearly involved in going-private trans-
actions, have traditionally been governed by state law. 65 Indeed, the full
disclosure policy reflected in the federal securities laws was thought "ill-
equipped to reach the problem of substantive fairness raised by going
private.", 66 Nevertheless, going-private litigation did gain access to the
federal courts67 through judicial expansion of section 10(b) 68 and rule
57. Going Private, supra note 52, at 908-09.
58. See Solomon, supra note 47, at 147 n. 19. Indeed, if the market price were lower
than the book value, reacquisition at a depressed price would increase the company's
book value. Going Private, supra note 52, at 908. This situation is not at all uncommon.
Thus, during 1977 while stock market prices were dropping, corporate profits and divi-
dends were rising. TIME, Dec. 19, 1977, at 82. General Motors provides a useful example
of the relative independence of market and book value. In 1965, General Motors stock
reached almost $114 per share. Although its profits have doubled since 1965, it sold for
approximately $65 a share in August. TIME, Aug. 29, 1977, at 44.
59. Going Private, supra note 52, at 908.
60. Id. at 909.
61. Borden, supra note 21, at 1008 n.105.
62. Id. at 1014; TIME, Aug. 29, 1977, at 50.
63. TIME, Aug. 29, 1977, at 54.
64. Borden, supra note 21, at 1014.
65. Generally, regulation of internal corporate affairs is regarded as being within the
purview of state law: "Corporations are creatures of state law, and investors commit their
funds to corporate directors on the understanding that except where federal law expressly
requires certain responsibilities of directors with respect to stockholders, state law will
govern the internal affairs of the corporation." Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975). See
also Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478 (1977). See, e.g., DEL CODE tit. 8,
§§ 251, 253 (1974 & Supp. 1977).
66. Going Private, supra note 52, at 912. See Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714, 720 (2d
Cir. 1972).
67. See Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970
(1967); Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 343 F. Supp. 1062 (N.D. Ga. 1972), aff'd on other
grounds, 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844 (1974).
68. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
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lOb-569 of the Exchange Act.
The emergence of a federal forum for going-private litigants received
favorable response.7" Moreover, it was contended that federal regulation
of going-private transactions was warranted since liberal state corporate
laws provided inadequate protection for minority shareholders. 7' Much
of the criticism of the absence of effective state regulation was directed at
Delaware: "The combination of Delaware law and the trend towards
liberalization of corporate codes in other states makes it clear that there is
virtually no likelihood of increased protection for minority shareholders
at the state level." 72 In addition to the judicial response, the SEC also
acknowledged the apparent need for federal regulation and proposed
rules governing the substantive area of going-private transactions.
73
Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green74 arose in the wake of this surge
toward the development of federal causes of action. Once again the
69. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977).
70. Second Circuit, supra note 13, at 1196-97; Establishing Federal Standards, supra
note 37, at 658-59.
71. Id.
72. Second Circuit, supra note 13, at 1199 (footnote omitted).
73. See SEC Proposed Rules 13e-3A, 13e-3B, Securities Act Release No. 5567 (Feb. 6,
1975), reprinted in [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,104.
Basically, rule 13e-3A would have imposed certain disclosure requirements and required
that the consideration for the public shareholders' stock be determined by "two qualified
independent persons." Id. Rule 13e-3B would have established a valid business purpose
test for all going-private transactions. The continued viability of these proposed rules was
doubtful in view of Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). See text
accompanying notes 78-79 infra. The proposed rules had been criticized, and it was
suggested that the SEC lacked authority to issue rule 13e-3B. Note, SEC Rulemaking
Authority and the Protection of Investors: A Comment on the Proposed "Going Private"
Rules, 51 IND. L. REv. 433, 446 (1976). Another criticism was that the rules would invade
an area of law traditionally governed by the developing common law and statutes of the
states. Greene, Corporation Freeze-Out Mergers: A Proposed Analysis, 28 STAN. L. REV.
487, 507 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Greene]. Moreover, it was believed that the rules had
been "abandoned". Note, Going Private: Who Shall Provide The Remedies?, 51 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 131, 146 (1976).
Nevertheless, the SEC recently revived and modified the proposed rules. SEC Pro-
posed Rule 13e-3, Securities Act Release No. 33-5884 (Nov. 17, 1977), reprinted in SEC.
REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 429, at E-1. Proposed Rule 13e-3 would prohibit a § 12 issuer
from purchasing "directly or indirectly, any such security if such 13e-3 transaction is
unfair to unaffiliated security holders." Id. at E-18. Ten factors are listed to aid in
determining the transaction's fairness. Id. at E-18-19.
The Commission contends that the validity of the new proposed rule is not affected by
Green. Id. at E-7. Still, the Commission's view that the Green rationale is limited to § 10b
and rule lOb-5 is questionable in light of the recent extension of the Green principles to §§
13 and 14 of the Exchange Act by the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York. SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 432, at A-9 (Dec. 14, 1977)
(referring to Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp. and Swift v. AFW Fabric Corp., S.D.N.Y.,
Dec. 1, 1977).
74. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
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adequacy of Delaware law was at issue. The insiders had utilized Dela-
ware's short-form merger statute to eliminate a five percent minority
interest in the corporation. Plaintiffs brought an action under rule 1Ob-5,
contending among other things that the merger transaction was fraudulent
since it was accomplished without a valid business purpose.75 Although
the district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of
action,76 the Second Circuit reversed.77 The United States Supreme
Court, in accordance with its policy of narrowing the scope of rule lOb-
5,78 held that absent deception, misrepresentation, or non-disclosure, rule
lOb-5 did not apply to going-private transactions.79
Shortly after Green, the Delaware Supreme Court adopted a business
purpose test for going-private transactions in Singer v. Magnavox Co.80
75. 391 F. Supp. 849, 852 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
76. Id. at 849.
77. 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976).
78. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
79. 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977).
80. 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977). The Singer decision is significant because of both the large
number of companies incorporated in Delaware and the influence the Delaware courts
have on other states. Shakin, Going Private: Court Rulings Have Sharply Raised the Ante,
Barron's, Oct. 10, 1977, at 26, col. 2.
The impact of Singer on California courts, however, will probably be slight since
California's new General Corporations Law effectively resolves many of the issues
confronting the Singer court. See CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 407(c), 1101(e), 1110(b), 1312(c)
(West 1977). Significantly, elimination of a greater than 10% minority interest in California
is critically hampered by two restrictions. First, discrimination against minority sharehold-
ers with respect to the type of consideration offered for their shares is prohibited since
"[e]ach share of the same class or series of any constituent company . . . shall . . . be
treated equally with respect to any distribution of cash, property, rights or securities." Id.
§ 1101(e). Second, when one of the parties to the transaction owns 50% or more of the
other party's voting power, the "nonredeemable common shares of a constituent corpora-
tion may be converted only into nonredeemable common shares of the surviving corpora-
tion." Id. Neither restriction applies to short-form mergers authorized under § 1110 or to
treatment of fractional shares as provided by § 407(c).
Additionally, both restrictions provided in § 1101(e) may be waived only by a unani-
mous vote of all the shareholders of the affected class. Id. Insofar as one member of the
affected class may prevent the majority of the minority shareholders from accepting
alternate types of consideration, the statute has been criticized. Barton, Business Combi-
nations and the New General Corporation Law, 9 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 738, 768 (1976).
Barton notes that elimination of the minority interest may be accomplished by either a
short-form merger or a reverse stock split with cash consideration offered in exchange for
the fractional shares. Id..at 766 n. 104. Neither method, however, may be used to eliminate
a minority interest of greater than 10%. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 1110(b), 407(c) (West 1977).
Nevertheless, the business purpose test enunciated in Singer could have some impact
on going-private transactions in California. Section 1312(c) of the General Corporation
Law shifts the burden of proving that the transaction is just and reasonable to the
surviving corporation when it has direct or indirect control over the constituent corpora-
tion. See note 154 infra. Conceivably, a business purpose test could be read into the just
and reasonable standard.
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In a companion case, Tanzer v. International General Industries, Inc. ,81
the court clarified the business purpose standard adopted in Singer. The
timing of the Singer decision was critical. Although in Green the
Supreme Court had refused to create a federal forum for going-private
transactions by expanding the judicial interpretation of rule 10b-5, the
threat of federal intervention under the proposed SEC rules still existed. 82
The court in Singer was clearly influenced by this prospect of federal
intervention.83 Indeed, according to Arthur Borden the strongest message
implicit in the Singer opinion "is that Delaware enforces the highest
standard of fiduciary obligations and there is consequently no reason for
any form of federal corporation statute." 4
81. 379 A.2d 1121 (1977).
82. A footnote in Green states: "Because we are concerned here only with § 10(b), we
intimate no view as to the Commission's authority to promulgate such rules under other
sections of the Act." Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473 n.12 (1977). See
note 73 supra for a discussion of the proposed SEC rules.
83. It is important to realize that the possibility of federal regulation of going-private
transactions inherent in the Second Circuit's decision in Green as well as the proposed
SEC rules (see note 73 supra) poses the threat of federal intervention in other areas of
corporate law traditionally governed by state law. As one commentator observed: "Green
v. Santa Fe Industries, Inc. and Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp. may be precursers of a
major body of judicially formulated federal corporate law." Barton, Business Combina-
tions and the New General Corporation Law, 9 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 738, 819 (1976)
(footnotes omitted). Moreover, federal intervention necessarily imposes a uniformity over
state law which negates the motivation for incorporating within a particular state. Such
uniformity would, of course, result in a substantial loss of incorporating revenues to those
states which have obtained a competitive advantage by virtue of their liberal corporate
statutes. See text accompanying note 84 infra. The threat of federal intervention in any
area of corporate law has serious economic consequences for Delaware. "Low taxes in
the state, combined with easy incorporation laws, have combined to make legal work one
of the main industries there." Shakin, Going Private: Court Rulings Have Sharply Raised
the Ante, Barron's, Oct. 10, 1977, at 26, col. 2. The policy exhibited in Delaware's
corporation laws is to promote the flexibility of the management and, thus, hopefully
entice greater incorporation within the state. See Folk, Some Reflections of a Corporation
Law Draftsman, 42 CONN. B.J. 409, 410 (1968). Moreover, this approach has been
successful:
The extent to which Delaware has preempted state corporation law applicable to our
largest industrial corporations is a matter of statistics; 40 percent of the companies
listed on the New York Stock Exchange are Delaware corporations. And it has been
estimated that over 200 of the Fortune 500 largest industrial corporations are also
incorporated in Delaware.
Jennings, Federalization of Corporate Law: Part Way or All the Way, 31 Bus. LAw. 991,
992-93 (1976) (footnote omitted). The ability of the revenue-seeking states to adequately
protect non-management interests has been questioned. Folk, Some Reflections of a
Corporation Law Draftsman, 42 CONN. B.J. 409, 416-17 (1968). Its notoriously liberal
corporate statutes thus not only made Delaware particularly demonstrative of the need for
federal regulation, but also made the threat of federal intervention financially unpalatable
for the state.




Singer involved an attempt by North American Philips Corporation
(North American) to acquire Magnavox Company (Magnavox). In Au-
gust of 1974, North American Philips Development Corporation (Devel-
opment), a wholly owned subsidiary of North American, tendered for
Magnavox's shares at eight dollars per share. Two days later, the board
of directors of Magnavox notified the Magnavox shareholders of its
decision to oppose Development's offer on the ground that, in view of
the eleven dollar per share book value, eight dollars per share was
inadequate. 5
In September, the managements of North American, Development,
and Magnavox negotiated a compromise whereby Development in-
creased the tender offer price to nine dollars per share and Magnavox
withdrew its opposition to the offer.8 6 The tender offer yielded Devel-
opment eighty-four percent of Magnavox's outstanding shares. In May,
Development incorporated T.M.C. Development Corporation (T.M.C.)
for the purpose of merging T.M.C. into Magnavox. The terms of the
merger provided that the holders of Magnavox's untendered shares
would receive nine dollars per share.8 7 The merger was unanimously
approved by Magnavox's board of directors.88 At a special stockholders'
meeting in July, with Development voting its shares in favor thereof, the
merger was approved and consummated. 9 Plaintiffs brought an action on
behalf of all non-tendering minority shareholders of Magnavox seeking
damages and nullification of the merger, alleging that the merger was
both fraudulent and a breach of fiduciary duty on the part of the majority
shareholders .90
Plaintiffs' contention that the merger was fraudulent because it was
designed solely to eliminate the minority shareholders and served no
valid business purpose was rejected by the court of chancery. 91 The court
went on to note that since the central issue of the complaint was inade-
quacy of the consideration offered for untendered shares, appraisal
9 2
85. Singer v. Magnavox Co., 367 A.2d 1349, 1352 (Del. Ch. 1976).
86. As part of the compromise agreement sixteen of Magnavox's officers entered into
two-year employment contracts with North American and Development at their then
current salaries. 380 A.2d at 971.
87. See note 128 infra and accompanying text.
88. 380 A.2d at 972. Of the nine-man board, four were also directors of North American
and three others had entered into two-year employment contracts with North American
and Development. Id. The Singer court, however, did not deal with the issue of a breach
of fiduciary duty on the part of the directors.
89. Id.
90. 367 A.2d at 1353.
91. Id. at 1349.
92. See note 129 infra.
1978]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
rather than nullification of the merger was the appropriate remedy and
granted defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of
action. 93
The Delaware Supreme Court reversed, 94 observing that although
defendant's full compliance with the merger statute95 was uncontrovert-
ed, "Delaware case law clearly teaches that even complete compliance
with the mandate of a statute does not, in every case, make the action
valid in law.' '96 The court noted that Development, as the majority
shareholder of Magnavox, owned a fiduciary duty to the minority share-
holders. 97 Development had not satsified that duty by offering fair value
for minority's shares.
98
The court went on to hold that in the absence of a valid business
purpose "a § 251 merger, made for the sole purpose of freezing out
minority stockholders, is an abuse of the corporate process . . .and [a]
violation of a fiduciary duty. "99 Finally, because Development stood on
both sides of the transaction, the court imposed the burden enunciated in
Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp.1°° of "establishing [the merger's]
entire fairness" and "pass[ing] the test of careful scrutiny by the
courts." 101 Thus, under Singer any corporation attempting a merger
transaction which will result in the elimination of the public shareholders
is subject to a "fairness hearing" and must be able to demonstrate a valid
business purpose for the transaction.
The Singer case represents an unexpected turning point in Delaware
corporate law. In Singer, the policy of protecting minority shareholders
prevailed over the policy of promoting corporate flexibility. 102 Undoubt-
edly, the language of Singer will reverberate from the keyboards of
many commentators. 0 3 Moreover, the Singer opinion has serious ramifi-
93. 367 A.2d at 1361-62.
94. 380 A.2d at 980.
95. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 1251 (1974 & Supp. 1977).
96. 380 A.2d at 975.
97. Id. at 976.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 980.
100. 93 A.2d 107 (Del. 1952).
101. Id. at 110 (cited in Singer, 380 A.2d at 976).
102. The policy of promoting corporate flexibility is regarded as a major reason for the
initial enactment of the Delaware merger statutes. Salt Dome Oil Corp. v. Schenck, 41
A.2d 583, 587 (Del. 1945), quoted in E. FOLK, THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION
LAW § 251, at 332 (1972). Folk notes that "[t]he 1967 revision of the statute, in particular,
reflects the 'continuing legislative approval' of mergers and the avoidance of their disrup-
tion by protesting stockholders." Id. (quoting Bastian v. Bourns, Inc., 256 A.2d 680, 684
(Del. Ch. 1969), aff'd per curiam, 278 A.2d 467 (Del. 1970)).
103. The case quickly roused a response from Arthur Borden. Borden, Some
Comments on Singer v. Magnavox, 178 N.Y.L.J. 66, at 1, col. 2 (1977).
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cations for companies incorporated within Delaware." The adoption of
extra-valuation protections for minority shareholders by Delaware,
which has traditionally been considered the most pro-corporation state in
the country,1 5 will serve as an influential guide to other states grappling
with the going-private phenomenon. 106 Thus, the superficiality of the
court's reasoning is rather disturbing and warrants careful scrutiny.
The reasoning in the Singer opinion is flawed in that it was grounded
neither on the factual uniquities of the case, policy considerations, nor
established precedent, and, in fact, ran contrary to the legislative scheme
in Delaware. These flaws in the court's analysis render the case of
questionable precedential value since it does not provide any substantial
basis for predicting the outcome of future going-private transactions.
Moreover, because the imposition of protections which extend beyond
fair valuation was inconsistent with both the legislative intent and estab-
lished precedent, the court in Singer was obligated to lead the reader
down a path of obfuscated reasoning to reach its desired result. Still, the
court did not explain why the valuation approach was rejected, and this
rejection becomes particularly questionable when the certainty of the
standard for determining the fair value of the public shareholders' stock
is contrasted with the nebulousness of the business purpose or "entire
fairness" standard enunciated by the court.
Significantly, the court's opinion is completely devoid of factual
analysis, and the circumstances of the case do not appear to be the most
appropriate vehicle for its opinion. 17 Singer was not a true going-private
transaction in which the insiders simply transfer their shares to a newly
formed corporation created to effectuate the merger.1° 8 The result of a
true going-private transaction is, in actuality, merely an internal reor-
ganization of the same corporation. In such transactions, the public
shareholders are clearly not afforded the benefit of an arms-length negoti-
ation since the terms of the transaction are unilaterally set by the in-
siders. 109
Instead, Singer involved an acquisition merger. 110 The terms of the
merger were not unilaterally set by the insiders of Magnavox, but rather a
104. See note 83 supra.
105. Id.
106. See note 80 supra.
107. Borden suggests that the case may be more applicable to true going-private
transactions than to the acquisition merger involved in the case. Borden, Some Comments
on Singer v. Magnavox, 178 N.Y.L.J. 66, at 1, col. 3 (1977).
108. See Greene, supra note 73, at 495.
109. Id. at 487.
110. 367 A.2d at 1349. The chancery court found this distinction significant. Id.
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third party, North American, 111 acquired the controlling interest in Mag-
navox through a successful tender offer. The presence of the third party
in the merger transaction gives the public shareholder the benefit of
negotiated merger terms. 12 Thus, Singer did not involve any of the more
blatant forms of abuse typically associated with going-private transac-
tions. The shareholder equity of Magnavox was not used to acquire the
minority interest, nor did the case involve a corporation which had
recently gone public at a considerable profit only to go private when the
stock market was low. I3 And, while the acquiring corporation "may, for
a variety of reasons, desire not to inherit . . . any of its stockhol-
ders,' "' the primary motivation for the merger, as the name implies, is
the acquisition of another corporation. Consequently, the Singer court
should never have reached the issue of a "merger, made for the sole
purpose of freezing out minority stockholders." 5
If the factual analysis in the case is weak, the court exacerbated this
inadequacy by its failure to provide any public policy analysis. The
policy of promoting corporate flexibility is much stronger in the acquisi-
tion merger than in the true going-private transaction. 116 The acquisition
merger generally results in an increased efficiency within the corporation
due to amelioration of conflicts of interest between and the achievement
of economics of operation for corporations competing in the same indus-
try. 11 7 Moreover, it may be the only expedient method of revitalizing or
replacing ineffective management. These policy considerations certainly
outweigh the relatively minor inconvenience to the displaced minority
shareholders who are compelled to seek a new investment,1  and should
have persuaded the court to limit the plaintiffs' remedy to an appraisal of
their shares.
111. North American was the actual acquiring company. Development and T.M.C.
were created by North American to effectuate the acquisition. See text accompanying
notes 86-88 supra.
112. Brudney, A Note on "Going Private", 61 VA. L. REV. 1019, 1029 (1975).
113. 367 A.2d at 1358.
114. Brudney, A Note on "Going Private", 61 VA. L. REV. 1019, 1026 n.28. (1975).
115. 380 A.2d at 980 (emphasis added). The court was forced to back off from the
Singer holding with respect to acquisition merger in Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus.,
Inc., 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977), discussed in text accompanying notes 168-81 infra. But
see Young v. Valhi, Inc., No. 5430 (Del. Ch. Feb. 22, 1978), discussed in text accompany-
ing notes 184-91 infra.
116. Brudney, A Note on "Going Private", 61 VA. L. REV. 1019, 1028-29 (1975);
Greene, supra note 73, at 494.
117. See note 185 infra and accompanying text.
118. See notes 228-30 infra and accompanying text.
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A. Utilization of Cases
In its use of case authorities, the Singer court seemed clearly to be
sculpting the available precedents to meet the needs of the court's new
position on going-private transactions. The court relied upon cases which
are clearly distinguishable from the Singer facts, while rejecting prece-
dents which are more factually analogous. As one commentator has
observed:
The reader will certainly note that the Court consistently employs
the technique of distinguishing cases implicit with contrary proposi-
tions by claiming that either on their facts or in the contentions made
they were not quite the same as the case in point, while relying on
other cases, less pertinent on their facts, because their language is
deemed more appropriate to the desired result, with untidy ends said
to be "overruled".' 19
By summarily distinguishing or overruling inconsistent cases,1 20 the
court failed to address the controversial issues in the case. Similarly, by
failing to explore the factual distinctions between Singer and the cases
relied upon to support its holding, the court conveyed a false sense of
precedential consistency.
The majority of cases cited by the court in support of its holding do not
even involve merger transactions.' 21 This sparsity of merger precedent in
Singer is significant since Delaware courts have held that the individual
corporate statutory provisions "have independent legal significance." 22
Thus, "a result prohibited . . .under one section of the law may be
entirely permissible . . . through the authorization of another
section. ''12 3
119. Borden, Some Comments on Singer v. Magnavox, 178 N.Y.L.J. 66, at 3, col. 1
(1977) (footnote omitted).
120. See note 132 infra.
121. Schell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971) (advancing the date of
annual meeting to thwart proxy fight); Kaplan v. Fenton, 278 A.2d 834 (Del. 1971)
(misappropriation of corporate opportunity); Dolese Bros. Co. v. Brown, 157 A.2d 784
(Del. 1960) (misappropriation of corporate opportunity); Johnston v. Greene, 121 A.2d 919
(Del. 1956) (misappropriation of corporate opportunity); Italo-Petroleum Corp. v. Hanni-
gan, 14 A.2d 401 (Del. 1940) (execution of notes not authorized by board of directors);
Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939) (misappropriation of corporate opportunity);
Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co., 230 A.2d 769 (Del. Ch. 1967) (issuance of additional
shares to thwart tender offer); Craig v. Graphic Arts Studio, Inc., 166 A.2d 444 (Del. Ch.
1960) (misappropriation of corporate opportunity); Bennett v. Breuil Petroleum Corp., 99
A.2d 236 (Del. Ch. 1953) (cancellation of shares and issuance of new shares to freeze out
minority shareholders); Brophy v. Cities Serv. Co., 70 A.2d 5 (Del. Ch. 1949) (reacquisi-
tion of corporate stock using inside information); Yasik v. Wachtel, 17 A.2d 309 (Del. Ch.
1941) (issuance of additional shares to acquire control).
122. 367 A.2d at 1354 (citation omitted).
123. Id. See note 130 infra for an example of a result achievable only through a merger.
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The factual dissimilarities between the cases cited in support of the
court's holding and the case before the court are significant. For instance,
Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co. 124 was cited for the proposition that
"corporate machinery may not be manipulated so as to injure minority
shareholders."' 125 However, Condec was not even technically a minority
oppression case. The plaintiff was a tender offeror who had acquired
slightly more than fifty percent of the target's outstanding common
stock. 126 In an effort to foil the tender offer, the director of the target
caused the corporation to issue previously authorized but unissued stock.
The plaintiff tender offeror claimed that the new issue resulted in an
equitable dilution of its interest in the target, effected with the sole,
purpose of defeating the tender offer. The court held that in issuing such
stock the directors had breached a fiduciary duty and ordered cancellation
of the shares. 
127
In Singer, however, the minority's interest was not diluted. Instead,
the minority's interest in the corporation was terminated with the plain-
tiffs receiving a sum higher than the market value of their stock in
exchange. 128 Additionally, the remedy of appraisal, available only when
corporations merge,1 29 was not available to the plaintiffs in Condec.130
124. 230 A.2d 769 (Del. Ch. 1967).
125. 380 A.2d at 979 (quoting Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co., 230 A.2d 769, 775
(Del. Ch. 1967)).
126. 230 A.2d at 772.
127. Id. at 777.
128. The tender offer as well as the cash-out-price was $9 per share. The market value
of Magnavox's stock on the day preceding the tender offer was approximately $4 per
share. Standard & Poor, 3 DAILY STOCK PRICE RECORD, NYSE 235 (1974). Book value as
of March 31, 1975 was $10.16. Brief for Appellee at 26, Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d
969 (Del. 1977).
129. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 262 (1974 & Supp. 1977) provides that the appraisal remedy is
available only in merger transactions. California, on the other hand, extends dissenter's
rights to all shareholders whose approval is required for any form of reorganization. CAL.
CORP. CODE § 1300(a) (West 1977).
Generally, the appraisal statutes give the dissenting shareholders in merger transactions
the right to compel the corporation to buy them out at an appraised value. The appraisal
remedy "is regarded as assuring substantial equivalence between the continued participa-
tion afforded to the insider and the cash or altered participation paid to the outsider."
Brudney, A Note on "Going Private", 61 VA. L. REV. 1019, 1027 n.33 (1975) (citations
omitted).
Under the Delaware appraisal remedy, the shareholder is entitled to "the intrinsic value
of [his] shares determined on a going concern basis." Application of Delaware Racing
Ass'n, 213 A.2d 203,209 (Del. 1965). The factors utilized to ascertain the "intrinsic" value
have been weighted as follows: assets, 25%; market value, 40%; earnings value, 25%; and
dividend value, 10%. Id. at 214. The remedy has been criticized as presenting the
dissenting shareholder with "an unattractive and complex procedural obstacle course-
supervised by a judiciary which, if not hostile, is disposed to present its stern Jehovan
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Possibly, it is the court's failure to attach any significance to these
distinctions which leaves answered but unexplored the critical issue in
the case-whether the utilization of a merger transaction to eliminate the
public shareholders is an abuse of corporate process and a manipulation
of corporate machinery. A corporate process can only be abused or
manipulated to the extent that it is used in a manner inconsistent with the
legislature's intent in authorizing that process. Therefore, without an
examination of the legislative intent behind the long-form merger statute,
the court's conclusion that the "use of corporate power to eliminate the
minority is a violation of [a fiduciary duty] ' 131 if done without a valid
business purpose, can only be regarded as tenuous.
To circumvent inconsistencies between Singer and established prece-
dents, the court speciously distinguished all of the defendant's merger
authorities on the basis that the minority shareholders were offered stock
for their shares rather than cash as in Singer. 132 The court did not offer
any justification for this distinction, nor does any justification exist.
Although at one time the long-form merger statute in Delaware did not
authorize a straight cash for stock conversion, 33 the statute was subse-
quently modified to provide for solely cash consideration." 3 Certainly
the fact that the amendment was adopted without qualifying language
aspect." Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72
YALE L.J. 223, 231 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Manning].
130. Delaware courts have found the availability of appraisal significant. Compare
Keller v. Wilson & Co., 190 A. 115 (Del. 1936) with Federal United Corp. v. Havender, 11
A. 2d 331 (Del. 1940). In Keller, minority shareholders obtained an injunction against a
charter amendment which would have altered the accrued dividends on their stock. In
Havender, minority shareholders again sought to enjoin the alteration of their preferred
stock. However, in Havender, the alteration of their interests was to take place through a
merger. The court noted that in this merger case, unlike the Keller case, the appraisal
remedy was available to the plaintiffs. Therefore, the court refused to issue the injunc-
tion. I 1 A.2d at 339.
131. 380 A.2d at 980.
132. The Court stated: "But none of these decisions involved a merger in which the
minority was totally expelled via a straight 'cash-for-stock' conversion in which the only
purpose of the merger was. . . to eliminate the minority." 380 A.2d at 978. See also note
141 infra. The cases thus distinguished are: MacCrone v. American Capital Corp., 51 F.
Supp. 462 (D. Del. 1943); Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 187 A.2d 78 (Del. 1962);
Federal United Corp. v. Havender, 11 A.2d 331 (Del. 1940); David J. Greene & Co. v.
Schenley Indus., Inc., 281 A.2d 30 (Del. Ch. 1971); Bruce v. E.L. Bruce Co., 174 A.2d 29
(Del. Ch. 1961). Bruce and Schenley were expressly overruled, while Stauffer was limited
to short-form mergers.
133. In 1967 the statute permitted "cash or securities of any other corporation. . . in
addition to the shares . . . of the surviving. . . corporation." 56 Del. Laws, ch. 50, §
251(b) (1967) (emphasis added).
134. A subsequent amendment in 1968 allows cash "in addition to or in lieu of" shares
of the surviving corporation. 56 Del. Laws, ch. 186, § 16 (1968) (emphasis added) (current
version at DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 251 (1974 & Supp. 1977)).
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after the going-private phenomenon had received much public attention
and debate 35 indicates that the legislature did not intend that any distinc-
tion be made. Nor can the distinction be justified on the basis that the
possibilities for abuse in a cash-out merger are greater than those in a
stock conversion merger since "debt securities or sinking fund preferred
stocks . . . will inevitably be liquidated by cash payments." 136 In
addition, it would appear to be to the minority's advantage to receive
cash rather than securities of doubtful valuation or liquidity. The fictional
nature of the cash-stock distinction is revealed by the fact that the
distinction was applicable only to the cases relied upon by the defend-
ants. If the distinction were applied uniformly, the cases relied upon by
the court to support its holding would also be deemed unworthy of
consideration.' 37 It is this lack of uniformity in imposing the cash-stock
distinction which suggests that it is a distinction without substance or
meaning created solely as a method for disposing of cases inconsistent
with the Singer holding.
The most important case to be felled by the cash-stock distinction was
David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Industries, Inc.'38 Schenley was
factually more similar to Singer than any other case cited in the court's
opinion. There, the public shareholders sought to enjoin the proposed
merger of the subsidiary into the parent. The parent owned eighty-six
percent of the subsidiary's outstanding stock, and the displaced public
shareholders were to be given cash and subordinated debentures in
exchange for their equity interest in the subsidiary. The Schenley court
noted that since the merger involved a cash and debenture rather than a
stock conversion, the controversy essentially centered on whether the
plaintiffs were receiving fair value for their equity interest. 139 According-
ly, the court concluded that appraisal was an adequate remedy for a value
dispute. 140
135. See, e.g., Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of the Dissenting Stockholder's Appraisal
Right, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1189 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Vorenberg]. It is also worth
noting that Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 178 A.2d 311 (Del. Ch. 1962), aff'd, 187
A.2d 78 (Del. 1962), had been decided five years prior to the amendment. There the court
interpreted the short-form merger statute's cash consideration provision as an authoriza-
tion for freeze-out mergers. See note 158 infra.
136. Fillman, Cash and Property as Consideration in a Merger or Consolidation, 62
Nw. U.L. REV. 837, 851 (1968).
137. See note 121 supra and accompanying text. The few merger authorities cited by
the court in support of its holding can be distinguished on the basis that they did not
involve cash-for-stock conversions. See Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107
(Del.1952); Bastian v. Bourns, 256 A.2d 680 (Del. Ch. 1969), aff'd per curiam, 278 A.2d
467 (Del. 1970); David J. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Int'l, Inc., 249 A.2d 427 (Del. Ch. 1968).
138. 281 A.2d 30 (Del. Ch. 1971).




The Singer court reacted to Schenley in two manners. First, Schenley
was distinguished on the basis that it did not involve a " 'cash-out
merger,' the sole purpose of which was to eliminate minority stockhol-
ders." 141 This distinction is completely untenable since the utilization of
subordinate debentures as partial consideration does not change the
ultimate cashing out of the minority shareholders but merely postpones
the time of its occurrence. Apparently recognizing the tenuousness of the
distinction, the court also overruled Schenley insofar as it was inconsis-
tent with Singer. 142 Clearly, if there had been any merit to the cash-stock
distinction, this overruling would not have been necessary.
The overruling of Schenley coupled with the revitalization of Sterling
v. Mayflower Hotel Corp. 143 indicates a distinct shift in the trend of
Delaware case law. The radical nature of this shift is evidenced by the
wide divergence of approach utilized in the two cases. Although both
cases involved interested mergers, 144 in Sterling the burden of establish-
ing the entire fairness of the transaction was imposed upon the defend-
ants, 145 while in Schenley the plaintiffs carried the burden of demonstrat-
ing fraud, illegality or serious overreaching by the defendants.
146
Despite the apparent irreconcilability of the two cases, it had been
generally assumed that the Schenley approach would set the trend in
situations where the dispute centered on share valuation. 147 The
continued vitality of Sterling had been seriously questioned, with Profes-
sor Ernest L. Folk suggesting that the doctrine was in "grave jeopar-
dy"' 148 and would most likely "receive only lip service." 149 At any rate,
a re-examination of the Sterling doctrine would have been appropriate in
Singer since neither the burden of proof nor the standard of judicial
review were contested by the Sterling defendants. 50 As Professor James
Vorenberg noted, "[o]ne can only speculate as to why the defendants
141. 380 A.2d at 978.
It is not clear from the court's language whether it is the existence of a business purpose
or the use of subordinated debentures as consideration which distinguishes Schenley from
Singer. A post-trial analysis by the Singer court of a business purpose which the Schenley
court did not deem dispositive, however, could only be regarded as presumptuous.
142. Id. at 980.
143. 93 A.2d 107 (Del. 1952).
144. Of course, all going-private transactions utilizing the merger technique are "inter-
ested mergers." See Note, Going Private: An Analysis of Federal and State Remedies, 44
FORDHAM L. REV. 796, 810-11 (1976).
145. 93 A.2d at 109-10.
146. 281 A.2d at 35.
147. E. FOLK, THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW § 251, at 334-36 (1972).
148. Id. at 336.
149. Id. at 335.
150. 93 A.2d at 109-10.
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made this concession rather than urging that the availability of appraisal
shifted the burden to plaintiff."
151
In some respects, however, the court's refusal to follow the Schenley
approach is not surprising. Adherence to the Schenley approach would,
to some extent, have required the court to accept the contention that the
minority shareholder's right "is exclusively in the value of his invest-
ment, not its form"-a proposition the court flatly rejected. 152 Neverthe-
less, instead of rejecting Schenley because its holding was inconsistent
with the adoption of the business purpose test, the court in Singer should
have followed the valuation approach embodied in Schenley because it
was consistent with established precedent.
The valuation rationale of Schenley should have and would have
prevailed had the court abstained from broad generalizations and
conducted a factual analysis of the case. If, as the court maintained, the
value of the shareholder's investment did not govern his rights, it certain-
ly formed the gravamen of the minority's complaint. It was not the
termination of the minority's equity position in Magnavox, but the
"forced removal of public minority shareholders .. . at a grossly
inadequate price,"' 153 which offended the plaintiffs. Thus, the issue
presented to the court was not whether the public shareholders may be
eliminated but, instead, at what price. Viewed in this light, neither the
court's rejection of the valuation approach154 nor its reference to a
sentimental attachment to stock was responsive to the issues presented in
Singer.
Moreover, the Sterling doctrine, placing the burden of establishing the
"entire fairness" of the transaction upon the defendants, seems unduly
151. Vorenberg, supra note 135, at 1212. In Singer, defendants also conceded the
issues. Brief for Appellee at 16, Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
152. 380 A.2d at 978. It should be noted that neither Singer nor Sterling discusses the
relevance of the appraisal remedy.
153. Id. See Opening Brief for Appellant at 1, Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969
(Del. 1977).
154. 380 A.2d at 977 n.8. The court is referring to an unreported California case,
Jutkowitz v. Bourns, Los Angeles Super. Ct. Case No. CA000268 Memorandum of
Decision (Nov. 19, 1975), noted in Barton, Business Combinations and the New General
Corporation Law, 9 LoY. L.A.L. REV. 738, 776 n.149. In Jutkowitz a merger was utilized
to eliminate a 10% minority interest. The court held that the majority shareholders' use of
the merger technique to eliminate the public shareholders was a breach of their fiduciary
duty to the latter and preliminarily enjoined consummation of the merger. The court's
holding was based on Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., I Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal.
Rptr. 592 (1969). In Jones the court held that the majority shareholders had breached their
fiduciary duty to the minority by excluding the minority shareholders from a profitable
going-public transaction.
In Singer, however, the court's reliance on Jutkowitz to reject the valuation approach is
questionable, particularly since Jutkowitz is not in accordance with the new California
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harsh and extreme. 15 In Singer, the defendant's fiduciary duty as a
majority stockholder arose solely as a result of a successful tender offer.
And, while the voluntariness of shareholder response to tender offers has
been questioned, 156 it nevertheless seems anomalous that the defendants
are alleged to have breached a fiduciary duty because the owners of the
majority of outstanding stock indicated their approval of the transaction
by tender rather than by vote of their stock. Furthermore, if the standard
of fairness is not completely subjective, it is logically inconsistent to
maintain that an offer deemed fair by the owners of eighty-four percent of
the outstanding stock may not be fair as to the owners of the remaining
sixteen percent.' 57
The overruling of Schenley is also notable since the case offered a rare
glimpse into Delaware's obscure legislative history. 158 A similar lack of
General Corporation Law. Jutkowitz was decided on the basis of the merger statute then
in effect which did not provide for a short-form merger procedure. Former CAL. CORP.
CODE § 4124, ch. 997, § 29, 1949 Cal. Stats. 1840, as amended by ch. 2261, § 30, 1957 Cal.
Stats. 3960 & ch. 1256, § 2, 1959 Cal. Stats. 3391 & ch. 789, § 4, 1968 Cal. Stats. 1533.
Subsequently, § 1110 of the General Corporation Law was enacted to allow a corpora-
tion to eliminate a 10% minority interest utilizing the short-form merger technique. CAL.
CORP. CODE § I 110 (West 1977). See Barton, Business Combinations and the New General
Corporation Law, 9 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 738, 777 (1976).
The minority shareholders thus displaced are entitled to an appraisal procedure under
CAL. CORP. CODE § 1300 (West 1977). However, the dissenter's rights provision is not the
shareholder's exclusive remedy when one of the parties is "directly or indirectly con-
trolled by. . . another party to the reorganization." Id. § 1312(b). Thus, if the sharehold-
er of the controlled corporation attacks the validity of the merger and does not elect the
dissenter's remedy, § 1312(c) imposes the burden on the controlling party to prove that the
transaction is just and reasonable. Id. § 1312(c).
155. See Vorenberg, supra note 135, at 1214.
156. See text accompanying notes 243-53 infra.
157. See Alcott v. Hyman, 16 Misc. 2d 192, 183 N.Y.S.2d 359 (Sup. Ct. 1958). Applying
Delaware law to a sale of assets transaction, the court found such reasoning persuasive:
"The shares sold or tendered . . . represent a very substantial majority of stockholders
who have thus indicated their approval of the proposed transaction. . . . And it is the
price which more than 80% of the stockholders have evidently deemed fair and rea-
sonable." Id. at 193-94, 183 N.Y.S.2d at 362.
158. See E. FOLK, THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW xviii (1972). Although
in Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 178 A.2d 311 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 187 A.2d 78 (Del.
1962), appraisal was held to be the exclusive remedy in a short-form cash-out merger, 178
A.2d at 314, the court also noted that its holding was not applicable to the long-form
statute, which did not have a similar cash consideration provision. See note 133 supra and
accompanying text. After Stauffer, the Delaware long-form statute, which had previously
spoken only of securities, was amended to provide for cash consideration. Id. With the
long-form merger statute thus amended, the court in Schenley adopted the Stauffer
approach: "In short, I am of the opinion that the rights of the plaintiffs and of other
minority shareholders of Schenley . . . are no greater under the. . . [long-form] Dela-
ware merger statute . . . than under the so-called short-merger statute. . . ." 281 A.2d
at 35. By overruling Schenley and limiting Stauffer to short-form mergers, Singer signifies
a departure from corporate case law and is inconsistent with legislative intent.
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concern with legislative intent is exhibited throughout the Singer opin-
ion. Although the court cited in full the relevant provisions of both the
long-form merger statute and the appraisal statute, 159 it did not discuss
the legislative intent behind either of them.
Significantly, the case was brought in equity, yet the inadequacies of
the legal remedy of appraisal were not analyzed. Examination of the
inadequacies of the appraisal remedy would have been particularly rele-
vant since appraisal proceedings had already commenced in connection
with the merger. 160 However, the court's covert disapproval of appraisal
as the only remedy was apparent: "In our view, defendants cannot meet
their fiduciary obligations to plaintiffs simply by relegating them to a
statutory appraisal proceeding.''161 Although the court did not elucidate
its reason for rejecting the appraisal remedy, a footnote suggests that the
rejection may in part have been predicated on the procedural difficulties
with the remedy. 162 Regardless of the procedural difficulties, the legisla-
ture in adopting the appraisal statute considered the primary issue in
merger transactions to be the value of the displaced shareholder's inter-
est. 163
Thus, while the court's rejection of the appraisal remedy was consis-
tent with its rejection of the valuation approach, the result seems to be
that internal consistency of the case was maintained at the expense of
adherence to legislative intent. Moreover, the court's failure to consider
the legislative intent behind the appraisal statute cannot be dismissed as
an oversight. The issue was distinctly raised by the chancery court:
"However, if a better method is to be found, it must be championed
through the General Assembly and not through a complaint which asks
this Court, in effect, to ignore the appraisal statute and the decisions of
159. 380 A.2d at 972-75 nn.3 & 4.
160. 367 A.2d 1349, 1362 (Del. Ch. 1976).
161. 380 A.2d at 977.
162. The court notes that the recently amended appraisal statute provides for plaintiff's
attorney and expert fees and concludes: "Realistically, that may broaden the scope of the
value inquiry in an appraisal proceeding but it is not significant here." Id. at 975 n.4. The
plaintiffs contended that the appraisal remedy was inadequate for two reasons. First, the
valuation focus of the remedy is not responsive to breaches of fiduciary duty. Second, the
appraisal remedy presents procedural difficulties for the plaintiffs. Opening Brief for
Appellants at 43-45, Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
163. See Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 178 A.2d 311, 314 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 187
A.2d 78 (Del. 1962). See also Grimes v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 392 F. Supp.
1393 (N.D. Fla. 1974) (applying Delaware law). There the court concluded: "It is clear that
the Delaware legislature has determined that a stockholder has no absolute right to his
interest in the corporation and may be forced to surrender his shares for a fair cash price."
Id. at 1403 (citations omitted).
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our Supreme Court which have held it to provide an adequate reme-
dy.,1
64
The legislative intent reasoning in Federal United Corp. v. Haven-
der165 received similar treatment from the Singer court. Although Ha-
vender involved the use of a merger to eliminate the cumulative divi-
dends in arrears on its preferred stock, and thus is factually dissimilar to
Singer, the importance of the case lies in the following statutory interpre-
tation guidelines enunciated for merger: (1) where the language of the
statute is clear the courts will "[add] nothing thereto and [take] nothing
therefrom," (2) "where the Legislature ha[s] made no exception to the
positive terms of a statute, the presumption is that it intended to make
none, and it is not the province of the court to do so," and (3) "[i]t is for
the Legislature not for the court, to declare the public policy of the
state." 166
Singer's adoption of a valid business purpose test stands in direct
conflict with the principles enunciated in Havender and falls perilously
close to judicial legislation. Again, however, the Singer court, em-
ploying a specious distinction, quickly dismissed the Havender rea-
soning on the basis that "the Merger Statute in effect at the time
Havender was written did not authorize a pure cash-for-shares conver-
sion." 6 7 In short, the court's consistent refusal to deal with any indica-
tions of legislative intent suggests the obvious-that Singer simply
cannot be harmonized with Delaware's legislative scheme.
B. Modification of Singer: Tanzer
In adopting the business purpose test, the Singer court left many issues
unresolved. Indeed, the court itself observed that one of the difficulties
with the valid business purpose test lies in determining whether the
business purpose looked to is that of the subsidiary or that of the
parent. 168 The court noted that if the business purpose of the subsidiary
was determinative, the result might well be academic or unrealistic since
the minority shareholders had been cashed out of an enterprise which
may have disappeared in the merger. 169 In contrast, if the purpose of the
parent was determinative, the "minority shareholders of the subsidiary
. . . may have undue difficulty in raising and maintaining the issue." 170
164. 367 A.2d at 1362 (citation omitted).
165. 11 A.2d 331 (Del. 1940).
166. Id. at 337.
167. 380 A.2d at 979.
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Finding neither possibility attractive, the court left the issue for another
day.
Similarly unresolved was the issue of whether the defendant's burden
of proving the entire fairness of the transaction would be satisfied by
indices of fair valuation. 171 Additionally, since the point in dispute before
the court was the sufficiency of the complaint, the conditions that would
satisfy the valid business purpose test were left unexplored.
Tanzer v. International General Industries, Inc.,172 decided shortly
after Singer, dealt with many of these issues. The case is factually
similar to Singer. International General Industries, Inc. (IGI) owned
eighty-one percent of Kliklok Corporation (Kliklok). IGI created a whol-
ly owned subsidiary, KLK Corporation (KLK). Subsequently, Kliklok
was merged into KLK with Kliklok's minority shareholders receiving
cash in exchange for their equity interest in the subsidiary. Plaintiffs
sought a preliminary injunction against the merger on the ground that it
did not serve a valid purpose of Kliklok.
Defendants advanced the business purpose of the parent to support the
transaction. Tanzer held that the parent's ability to obtain long term
financing satisfied the business purpose test. 171 The court also noted that
indices of fair valuation alone would not satisfy the Sterling/Singer
doctrine, and remanded the case to the chancery court for a full fairness
hearing.1
74
Tanzer employed a liberal construction of the business purpose test.
As the court observed, the emphasis was on the majority shareholders'
rights. 175 Thus the court conceded that the fiduciary duty of the majority
did not abridge the majority's right to vote its shares 176 in its own interest
and concluded that "[als a stockholder, IGI need not sacrifice its own
interest in dealing with a subsidiary, but that interest must not be suspect
as a subterfuge, the real purpose of which is to rid itself of unwanted
minority shareholders.
177
The importance of this conclusion is exemplified by a fact not men-
tioned in the court's opinion. Although the majority assured the merger's
success by voting their shares in its favor, the merger was also approved
by over ninety percent of the minority shares voting. 178 In declining the
171. See note 183 infra.
172. 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977).
173. Id. at 1124-25.
174. Id. at 1125.
175. Id. at 1123-24.
176. Id. at 1124.
177. Id.
178. Letter'Opinion and Order on Plaintiff's Application for a Preliminary Injunction
by Chancellor William T. Quillen (Dec. 23, 1975), at 1.
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enticing option of basing its holding on the approval by the minority
shareholders, the court avoided entanglement with corporate democracy
tenets. Moreover, the court apparently recognized that unless the majori-
ty is allowed to vote in its own interest the result would be to effectively
eliminate the majority shareholder's role in merger transactions. 1
79
Another issue raised by the plaintiffs, but again not mentioned in the
court's opinion, may be important. Although an independent appraiser
had determined the cash-out price, the plaintiffs contended that the price
was nevertheless unfair since it did not reflect the economic benefit the
parent derived from the transaction.180 In light of the complexity sur-
rounding this extra-valuation remedy issue, the Tanzer court's reluctance
to deal with it is not surprising. Singer also neglected to explore the
difficulties of fashioning an extra-valuation remedy.18'
C. Impact
The imposition of a business purpose test in Singer will clearly serve
as a deterrent to both the true going-private transactions and the merger
acquisitions. This deterrence stems in part from the uncertainty of the
obligation imposed on the majority shareholder. While it is clear that the
test is two-pronged and the defendants must show both a valid business
179. The imposition of a valid business purpose standard restricts the majority's voting
power in that the majority's vote will not be given effect unless it is accompanied by a
valid business purpose.
180. Letter Opinion and Order on Plaintiff's Application for a Preliminary Injunction
by Chancellor William T. Quillen (Dec. 23, 1975), at 3.
181. See note 152 supra and accompanying text. The court's evident willingness to
enjoin going-private transactions is disturbing. If the transaction has already been
consummated, it "can hardly be unscrambled, since it is inconceivable that many share-
holders would be willing to disgorge their cash in return for their prior equity position."
Borden, Some Comments on Singer v. Magnavox, 178 N.Y.L.J. 66, at 3, col. 3 (1977).
Moreover, even if the transaction has not been consummated, many of the shareholders
who voluntarily sold their shares to the majority may have similar misgivings about
exchanging their cash for their equity interest. Enjoining the transaction may thus restore
the dissenting shareholders' equity position in a corporation with limited market liquidity.
See text accompanying notes 243-44 infra.
Additionally, it is difficult to see how the court could fashion a remedy which would
restore the diminished liquidity of the corporation's stock. Clearly, the court cannot
compel the shareholders who sold their stock to the majority to repurchase their equity
positions. It seems equally inequitable to compel the majority to resell to the public the
stock it purchased from the minority at a price substantially above the market value of the
stock. See text accompanying notes 229-30 infra.
However, if the minority cannot be adequately restored within the corporation, the
plaintiff's remedy would appear to be damages. But as Edward Greene observes, "the
court will of necessity be required to establish a fair price in order to assess damages. That
very process duplicates an appraisal proceeding created for the same purpose and may
lead to different results." Greene, supra note 73, at 505.
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purpose and the entire fairness of the transaction, the criteria necessary to
satisfy either standard are vague.
182
The Tanzer decision also indicated that indices of fair valuation
83
alone will not satisfy the entire fairness doctrine of Sterling. The court's
unwillingess to elucidate those additional indices of fairness instills
further uncertainty in going-private transactions. Moreover, since the
judicial scrutiny of the merger is triggered solely by the elimination of the
minority from an on-going enterprise regardless of the ultimate fairness
of the terms of the merger, the Singer decision will result in both an
increase in litigation and a corresponding delay in the consummation of
such transactions. This injects an element of expense and delay into both
the true going-private transaction and the acquisition merger.
Although the Tanzer opinion indicated that the business purpose test
adopted in Singer would be liberally construed at least with respect to
acquisition mergers, a recent chancery court decision, Young v. Valhi,
Inc.,8 4 suggests otherwise. In granting the plaintiffs' application for a
permanent injunction against consummation of the proposed cash-out
merger, the Young opinion appears to have significantly expanded the
Singer rationale. Like Tanzer, Young also involved a takeover attempt
with Contran Corporation and Farnham Corporation vying for control of
Valhi. An injunction against Farnham enabled Contran to successfully
acquire a fifty-five percent controlling interest in Valhi. Subsequent
purchases resulted in Contran's owning approximately sixty-five percent
of Valhi's outstanding stock at the time of the trial. Contran's plan to
acquire the remaining interest of Valhi through a cash-out merger,
however, was hindered by an anti-takeover provision in Valhi's charter
182. Judge Moore criticized the business purpose test as a "totally amorphous stan-
dard." Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283, 1308 (2d Cir. 1976) (dissenting
opinion), rev'd, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). Similarly, Professor Folk observed that "the issue
still remains unsettled as to . . . how far, the courts will . . . scrutinize an 'interested
merger' and determine its fairness." E. FOLK, THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION
LAW § 251, at 334 (1972).
183. The cash-out price in Tanzer was determined by an independent expert investment
banking firm. Letter Opinion and Order on Plaintiff's Application for a Preliminary
Injunction by Chancellor William T. Quillen (Dec. 23, 1975), at 3. Although Chancellor
Quillen found this fact persuasive, the Delaware Supreme Court did not attach any
significance to it. Other indices of fairness include approval of the transaction by a
majority of the minority and determination of the transaction by a committee of indepen-
dent directors. All three indices of fairness tend to restore the negotiation process to an
arms-length basis.
In Tanzer, the court refused to allow approval of the transaction by a majority of the
minority shareholders to overshadow the majority's voting rights. This index should still
be persuasive, however, in determining the fairness of the transaction.




which required approval by the holders of eighty percent of Valhi's
outstanding stock to effectuate a merger if the other party to the transac-
tion owned a five percent or greater interest in Valhi. Another charter
provision required only a majority vote if the proposed merger was
between Valhi and one of its wholly owned subsidiaries. Thus, after
several unsuccessful endeavors to obtain the requisite eighty percent
vote, Contran attempted to eliminate the remaining shareholders by
merging Valhi into its wholly owned subsidiary, VIS Corporation. The
cash-out price to be paid to the eliminated minority shareholders was
$22.50-twice the market value of Valhi's stock.
Plaintiffs sought to enjoin the consummation of the proposed merger,
challenging both the validity of Contran's business purpose and the
fairness of the transaction. Contran maintained that the elimination of
potential conflict of interest claims as well as a $150,000 tax savings
qualified as valid business purposes. 8 - The court characterized both of
the business purposes advanced by Contran as "contrived,""8 6 observing
that the number of conflict of interest claims in the past had been minimal
and that the tax savings could be accomplished by other means. 187 Thus,
the court apparently imposed an additional requirement on the valid
business purpose test: the elimination of alternative means of achieving
the resulting benefits. In so doing, the court clearly goes beyond the
Singer holding, which merely required the existence of a valid business
purpose.
The court also was not impressed by the fact that an independent
investment banking firm had determined the cash-out price or that an
independent director had found the "proposed merger to be fair, rea-
sonable and equitable to the minority stockholders. 188 By refusing to
regard the presence of the independent investment banking firm as
significant, Young is consistent with Tanzer's holding that indices of fair
valuation alone do not satisfy the entire fairness requirement. However,
the court's failure to attach any significance to the presence of the
independent director is disturbing. Since the fairness determination by
the independent director was not limited to a determination of fair
185. See Grimes v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 1393, 1402 (N.D.
Fla. 1974) (applying Delaware law) (elimination of potential claims of conflict of interest
and joint economy of operation constitute valid business reasons for freeze-out merger).
Indeed, one of the harshest critics of going-private transactions concedes that "the
elimination of a minority interest as the last step in a corporate amalgamation is a proper
purpose." Kerr, Going Private: Adopting a Corporate Purpose Standard, 3 SEC. REG.
L.J. 33, 60 (1975) (footnote omitted).
186. No. 5430, slip. op. at 12 (Del. Ch. Feb. 22, 1978).
187. Id., slip op. at 9-10.
188. Id., slip op. at 11.
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valuation alone,, it should have been afforded greater weight in the
court's analysis.
The court's decision to enjoin the proposed merger as unfair was
heavily influenced by the fact that Contran had designed the merger of
Valhi into its subsidiary, VIS, to circumvent the eighty percent vote
requirement of the otherwise applicable anti-takeover provision.
"Contran has undertaken to manipulate corporate machinery to accom-
plish an inequitable result, namely the unilateral elimination of . . .
minority stockholders in exchange for cash by a vote of less than 80% of
such corporation's voting stock.''189 This conclusion, however, ignores
the fact that anti-takeover provisions are not enacted to protect minority
shareholders but rather to protect incumbent management from the possi-
bility that the acquiring corporation might no longer desire their serv-
ices. 190 Moreover, the prospect of unemployment for the incumbent
management was extremely high here since prior to Contran's acquiring
control of Valhi at least an eleven million dollar loss was attributable to
mismanagement. 191 Thus, the future effect of the court's holding will be
to grant extraordinary protection to the inefficient management of target
corporations and to deter the socially desirable acquisition of "sick"
corporations by economically sound corporations.
As Tanzr and Young illustrate, the extent of the Singer holding is
unclear. Although the court in Singer pointedly limited its holding to
cases involving an exchange of cash for stock, whether the court also
limited its holding to long-form mergers is questionable. The uncertainty
in this regard is created by the court's treatment of Stauffer v. Standard
Brands, Inc."9 There the Delaware Supreme Court had held that ap-
praisal was the exclusive remedy for the eliminated minority sharehold-
ers of a short-form merger utilizing a straight stock for cash conver-
sion. 193 By refusing to read Stauffer as endorsing "a merger accom-
plished solely to freeze-out the minority without a valid business pur-
pose,"' 94 the Singer court cast doubt upon the use of the valuation
189. Id., slip op. at 13.
190. See generally E. KINTNER, PRIMER ON THE LAW OF MERGERS 90-93 (1973).
191. No. 5430, slip op. at 5.
192. 178 A.2d 311 (Del. Ch,), aff'd, 187 A.2d 78 (Del. 1962).
193. 187 A.2d at 80.
194. 380 A.2d at 979. The court's reading of Stauffer was clearly erroneous. See note
158 supra and accompanying text. Additionally, the holding in Stauffer was firmly based
on the valuation approach. Observing that Delaware's short-form merger statute was
modeled after New York's short-form merger statute, the Stauffer court cited a New York
case:
In short, the merged corporation's shareholder has only one real right; to have the
value of his holding protected, and that protection is given him by his right to an
[Vol. 11
GOING-PRIVATE TRANSACTIONS
approach in short-form mergers as well. In Kemp v. Angel, 195 a Dela-
ware Chancery Court recently extended the Singer rationale to short-
form mergers. In Kemp, fraud was alleged in the acquisition of the
ninety percent stock interest necessary to effectuate the short-form mer-
ger. It should be noted that technically Kemp was not incompatible with
Stauffer since the Stauffer holding was specifically directed to situations
not involving fraud.196 However, a subsequent case, Najjar v. Roland
International Corporation'97 held that the Singer rationale was applica-
ble to short-form mergers even though no allegation of fraud was
contained in the complaint. The Najjar court concluded that
when a complaint attacking a merger "alleges" that its sole purpose
is to eliminate minority interests, such a complaint is now virtually
immune from a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of
action, especially when the basis for such a motion would be, as
here, that the plaintiff is only complaining about the amount paid for
the minority shares.
198
The importance of the Najjar holding, however, is uncertain. In re-
sponse to Singer and the possibility that its holding would be extended to
short-form mergers, the General Corporation Law Committee has recent-
ly proposed amendments to the General Corporation Law.I99 The proposed
amendment to section 253 would codify the Stauffer holding that made
appraisal the exclusive remedy for displaced minority shareholders in
short-form mergers. Should the legislation be adopted, the Najjar hold-
ing would be stripped of its momentary significance.
appraisal. . . . He has no right to stay in the picture, to go along into the merger, or
to share in its future benefits.
178 A.2d at 315 (quoting Beloff v. Consolidated Edison Co., 300 N.Y. 11, 87 N.E.2d 561
(1949)).
195. SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 434, at A-12 (Jan. 4, 1978).
196. 178 A.2d at 314.
197. No. 5491 (Del. Ch. May 8, 1978).
198. Id., slip op. at 11.
199. The General Corporation Law Committee, Proposed Amendments to the General
Corporation Law 5, 11-12, 15-16 (1978). It should be noted that at present the proposed
amendments do not affect the Singer holding as to long-form mergers.
The General Corporation Law Committee has also suggested amendments to the ap-
praisal statute. Significantly, the proposed amendment would eliminate the requirement
that the determination of the fair value of the dissenter's stock be exclusive of any
increase in value attributable to the proposed merger. The theory behind compensating the
minority shareholders on the basis of majority shareholders' gain appears to be predicated
on the notion that the minority shareholders would have participated in this gain had they
not been excluded from the on-going enterprise. Such logic is, of course, fallacious since
any gain to the majority from the going-private transaction would not have occurred
without the minority shareholders being eliminated from the enterprise. If the minority
shareholders had remained in the corporation the value of their stock would not have
changed because the corporation would have remained public. Determining the value of
the minority shareholders' stock on the basis of the majority's gain, therefore, does not
accurately reflect the actual injury the minority shareholder has suffered. Id./
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Finally, the coercive effect of these decisions should be noted. Under
Singer, plaintiffs acquire a powerful instrument of persuasion-the
threat of litigation.2" No matter how weak the plaintiff's case, it is
frequently less expensive for the majority to meet the plaintiff's demands
than it is to litigate the issue.2 ' Thus, the court's contention that the
decision did not resurrect minority veto power seems unrealistic.20 2
IV. PROPOSAL
A. Generally
The extra-valuation protections adopted in Singer are ill-founded. As
will be demonstrated, extra-valuation protections represent an emotional
response to an economic problem and are based on misconceptions
concerning the investor's interest within the corporation. Since these
protections can be maintained only at the expense of corporate flexibility
and shareholder democracy tenets, they should be abandoned. The reme-
dy for the displaced public shareholder should be limited to fair valua-
tion, which affords the shareholder the necessary protection of his invest-
ment with the minimal impairment of corporate flexibility.
The essential issue in going-private transactions is the nature of the
shareholder's interest in the corporation. The notion that a shareholder
may be forcibly ejected from a corporation without his individual consent
is offensive to a society that values self-determination.03 Indeed, the
most pointed criticism of going-private transactions centers on the major-
ity's unilateral action which terminates the minority's interest in the
corporation. 2 4
Similarly, the proposed solutions focus on correcting the involuntari-
ness of the shareholders' elimination. Thus, the majority's unilateral
action in Singer is tempered by imposing the burden of proving the
fairness of the transaction upon the interested majority. Singer also
remedies the apparent flaw in corporate democracy which allows the
200. Vorenberg, supra note 135, at 1215 (referring to Sterling).
201. See note 45 supra.
202. 380 A.2d at 978. "And from the majority's point of view, the removal of the
minority's veto of basic transactions will lose much of its significance if, in order to
consummate a transaction which gives rise to appraisal, the majority must sustain an
unrealistically rigorous burden of showing the fairness of the transaction." Vorenberg,
supra note 135, at 1205.
203. It is the lack of volition on the part of the minority which is advanced as a primary
justification for restrictions on going-private transactions. See Going Private, supra note
52, at 923.
204. "Going private will raise significant issues under corporate common law to the
extent that insiders can use corporate mechanisms unilaterally to slice the corporate pie
into portions which satisfy their appetite alone." Id. at 913-14. See also Vorenberg, supra
note 135, at 1202.
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minority's continued participation in the corporation to be predicated
solely upon the percentage of outstanding stock owned by the insiders
and subject exclusively to their whims. Hence, the majority shareholders
retain their right to vote, but the power of that vote is dependent upon
their ability to prove the fairness of and demonstrate a valid business
purpose for the transaction. Conversely, the minority shareholders are
given a contingent right of continued participation within the enterprise,
since if the merger is unfair or does not have a valid business purpose
minority shareholders may seek to enjoin or void the majority-approved
merger.
Thus, the majority shareholders, once the predetermined victors in the
intra-corporate struggle, are now given a judicial handicap. With the
bargaining power of the minority enhanced, the ensuing struggle be-
comes more sporting, 20 5 and unfortunately, more expensive. Undoubted-
ly, the legal reasoning which produces such a result is emotionally
appealing. 2' At issue, however, is whether it is also logically sound.
Protection of minority shareholders has become an increasingly popu-
lar theme in corporate law generally and particularly in the going-private
area. The validity of such safeguards, however, is dependent upon the
extent to which they prevent an actual injury or the invasion of certain
rights. In addition, these safeguards should accurately reflect the nature
of the minority's interest within the corporation.
Ultimately, minority shareholder protection which extends beyond the
fair value of the investor's shares assumes that the minority's interest
within the corporation is not exclusively economic. Neither courts nor
commentators, however, have identified the nature of the shareholder's
non-economic interest. A careful review of commentaries and cases
reveals that they also do not address the specific injury which the
business purpose test prevents. A breach of fiduciary duty which pro-
duces no injury surely is not actionable.2' 7 Furthermore, the implication
that the shareholder's elimination itself is the injury merely begs the
205. As Professor Vorenberg observes: "To the extent that an injunction against the
proposed action is an effective third choice available to the dissenter, his bargaining
position may be significantly strengthened and the freedom of action of those in control of
the corporation correspondingly inhibited." Vorenberg, supra note 135, at 1191.
206. The emotional flavor such protections have developed is well illustrated by Ap-
plestein v. United Board & Carton Corp., 60 N.J. Super. 333, 352-53, 159 A.2d 146, 157,
aff'd, 33 N.J. 72, 161 A.2d 474 (1960): "The majority, no matter however overwhelming it
may turn out to be, may not trample upon the property and appraisal rights of the minority
shareholders . . ., no matter how few they may be in number."
207. The Restatement of Torts makes a distinction between "harm" and "injury".
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 7 (1965). Although a detriment is involved in a harm,
it is not necessarily involved in an injury. Id., Comment d. An injury, it is noted, may be an
invasion of a legally protected interest. For example, trespass upon land is an injury which
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question. Aside from investment valuation, the issue critically posed is
whether the shareholder's elimination is an injury.
Indeed, the nature of the minority's injury becomes apparent only
through the circuitous approach of examining the remedy. The effect of
the business purpose test is to give the shareholder a conditional right of
continued participation and thus indicates that the minority's injury is the
invasion of this conditional right.2 8 It is, of course, important to note that
the provision of such a right is the effect of any remedy in going-private
transactions which allows the minority to prevent its elimination from the
enterprise.
B. Continued Right of Participation
If the shareholder does have a right of continued participation within
the corporation, the right clearly is not pervasive. 2 9 There is, of course,
no guarantee that the corporation will continue to exist in any form and
the possibility of its dissolution is merely one of the risks inherent in
investment.210 Similarly, in the case of major corporate changes, there is
no assurance that the corporation will continue to exist in its initial form.
The investor may thus find that the corporation in which he initially
invested is for all practical purposes not the one in which he is presently a
shareholder.211 Arguably, if the corporation continues to exist in some
frequently occurs without a harm. Id., Comment a. For purposes of this article when
"injury" is referred to in the text, a harm will be assumed.
In going-private transactions, it would appear that an injury is necessary in order to
justify the imposition of a remedy. The property interest a shareholder has in the corpora-
tion is at best an intangible interest with none of the static physical qualities of land.
Indeed, Professor Bayless Manning describes the shareholder's claim as evolving from
"'ownership' to the status of a fungible dollar claim." Manning, The Shareholder's
Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223, 230 (1962). Moreover,
he reasons: "This approach represents a relatively refined state of judicial development,
for it means that the modem court will not today enjoin the transaction without a
substantive showing of severe economic injury to the plaintiff-an inquiry that a
nineteenth century court would not have found necessary." Id. at 246 n.38.
208. At one extreme, the theory has been advanced that a shareholder hasithe right
to retain his interest in the corporation. Relying on the premise that the shareholder,
as the owner of a unit of interest in the corporation, possesses a property right, it is
argued that he should not be deprived of his ownership unless there are clear and
imperative reasons for such an occurrence in terms of the needs of the corporation.
Comment, Corporate Freeze-Outs.Effected by Merger: The Search for a Rule, 37 U. PirrT.
L. REv. 115, 117 (1975).
209. Borden states that an outside shareholder's "right" to continued participation has
been "so diluted by the variety of permissible permutations in corporate equities that the
contemporary shareholder probably does not even imagine that such a vested right
exists." Borden, supra note 21, at 1017.
210. Manning, supra note 129, at 250-51; Vorenburg, supra note 135, at 1203.
211. Although the New York Court of Appeals was dealing with the duties of a trustee,
its observations concerning corporate changes are relevant here:
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form, the determination of whether the shareholder remains within the
corporation should be one of personal choice.212 Generally, the share-
holder confronted with a corporate change can either accept the invest-
ment risks reflecting that alteration or exercise the dissatisfied sharehold-
er's option of selling his stock. Moreover, in a merger transaction,
appraisal statutes typically insure the investor's right to opt out. 213 In
going-private transactions, however, allowing the continued participa-
tion of the investor in the corporation to be one of personal choice
necessarily conflicts with the notion that the individual may not prevent
fundamental corporate changes. It is important to note that this conflict is
irreconcilable since the investor's decision to remain in the corporation
would effectively thwart the corporation's plan to go private.
C. Vested Rights Theory
Although the right of continued participation is not generally recog-
nized in corporate law, it is by no means an entirely new concept.214 Its
forerunner, the vested rights theory, gave the individual shareholder the
right to veto any major corporate change2 15 and haunted polemicists until
it was finally abandoned by the courts.216 The vested rights doctrine did
not retire gracefully; "[w]henever the court was of the opinion that
certain rights of stockholders could not be interfered with, they charac-
terized those rights as 'vested'. "217 Thus, the doctrine's resurrection in
the going-private area is accompanied by a natural reluctance by the
courts to recognize its presence.28
We think the identity of the Shuttleworth shares was ended by the merger. . .. Here
the investment is radically different. The change of identity has relation not to form
only, but to substance. The tale is only partly told when we say that the consolidated
corporation is a new juristic person. It is that, but it is something more. The shares
have been issued in new proportions and classified in new ways . . . . The old
investment has been subordinated to alien priorities. The ancient venture has exposed
itself to strafige and unexpected hazards.
Mertz v. Guaranty Trust Co., 247 N.Y. 137, 141-42, 159 N.E. 888, 889 (1928).
212. See Going Private, supra note 52, at 923 (involuntariness of elimination warrants
imposing restrictions on going-private transactions).
213. Manning, supra note 129, at 226.
214. Brudney, A Note on "Going Private", 61 VA. L. REV. 1019, 1022 n.12. Brudney
explains: "The common law concept that an equity interest could not be terminated by
dissolution or structurally altered without unanimous consent underlies . . . the notion
that equity owners cannot be 'forced' out of their enterprise." Id.
215. Gibson, How Fixed Are Class Shareholder Rights?, 23 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 283,
285 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Gibson].
216. The doctrine was not formally rejected, but rather fell into a state of disuse when
transactions previously barred as an invasion of vested rights were allowed under merger
statutes. Compare Keller v. Wilson & Co., 190 A. 115 (Del. 1936) with Federal United
Corp. v. Havender, 11 A.2d 331 (Del. 1940).
217. McNulty v. W. & J. Sloane, 184 Misc. 835, 841,54 N.Y.S.2d 253, 259-60 (Sup. Ct.
1945).
218. None of the Delaware opinions, for instance, mention the historical basis of the
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It is important to note, however, that there are significant distinctions
between the vested rights theory and the continued participation right
doctrine. Under the vested rights theory, the individual shareholder had
the power to veto any major corporate change. As the rate of technologi-
cal growth accelerated, the individual's veto power severely inhibited the
corporation's ability to adapt.219 Eventually, this veto power was re-
placed by majoritarian decision making.220
In contrast, the minority's power to override a transaction approved by
the majority is substantially restricted under the doctrine of continued
participation. The minority's veto power arises only if the transaction
will result in his elimination from an on-going enterprise and was ap-
proved by the majority without a valid business purpose. Thus the
validity of the right of continued participation is not necessarily pre-
cluded by the judicial rejection of the vested rights thory, and the factors
that initially justified the vested rights doctrine are equally applicable to
the continued participation doctrine.
D. Viability of a Property-Oriented Approach to Shareholder's Rights
The vested rights doctrine arose at a time when corporations were
small and their shareholders were few.22' Typically, the shareholder's
investment included a substantial expenditure of time and energy to
ensure the corporation's success. In a very real sense, the shareholder's
involvement with the corporation and his fellow shareholders was of a
personal nature.222
In this context, the requirement of unanimous consent for major
corporate changes accurately reflected the shareholder's interest within
the corporation.223 The veto power was necessary to protect the share-
holder's reasonable expectation that his ownership and employment
within the corporation would not be altered without his consent. Addi-
tionally, the veto power prevented a tangible injury since the market
value of the corporation's stock was not representative of the sharehold-
er's personal investment in the corporation. Finally, the need for corpo-
rate flexibility was not considerable.
Today, however, the public shareholder's investment is primarily
shareholder's right to prevent his elimination from the enterprise. See, e.g., Singer v.
Magnavox, 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977); Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d
1121 (Del. 1977); Young v. Valhi, Inc., No. 5430 (Del. Ch. Feb. 22, 1978).
219. Gibson, supra note 215, at 284.
220. Id. at 291.
221. Id. at 283.
222. Id.; see Lattin, The Minority Stockholder and Intra-Corporate Conflict, 17 IOWA
L. REV. 313, 319 (1932).
223. Gibson, supra note 215, at 283.
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speculative in nature.2 24 Generally he is neither employed by the corpora-
tion nor does he meaningfully participate in its growth. 225 The investor's
reasonable expectations are focused on the corporation's ability to
achieve a profitable return on his investment.226 Thus, the right of
continued participation reflects neither the investor's interest within the
corporation nor his reasonable expectations concerning his investment.
227
Moreover, the monetary nature of the public shareholder's investment
negates the possibility of a non-economic injury. Certainly the cost of
reinvesting in another corporation is not a serious disadvantage. 228 The
cash-out price is generally substantially higher than the market value of
the investor's stock229 and actually enables the investor to increase the
size of his holdings in another corporation.
230
Furthermore, the suggestion advanced in Singer that the public share-
holder might have an emotional attachment to his investment is not
convincing.231 Even assuming arguendo that a public shareholder might
actually have such an emotional interest in a company, given the rarity of
its occurrence, that interest should not be one that society considers
reasonable and worthy of protection. Indeed, the concept of a sentimental
investment completely ignores the return-on-investment orientation of
the stock market. 32 As one commentator has suggested, "[p]erhaps it is
not unreasonable to assume that if the parties proceed on the basis of a
[non-economic] link between stockholding and some other connection, it
should be protected by a contract or charter provision.'"233 Clearly, the
224. Id. at 287; see Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management in
Modem Corporate Decisionmaking, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 45 (1969).
225. See Borden, supra note 21, at 1015.
226. Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management in Modern Corpo-
rate Decisionmaking, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 82 (1969).
227. Eisenberg reasons that "[i]n the absence of any hard data concerning the expecta-
tions of shareholders in publicly held corporations, the following assumption. . . will be
made: The extent to which a shareholder in such a corporation expects and wants to
participate in structural decisions is intimately related to the size of his holdings." Id. at
33.
228. Contra, Brudney, A Note on "Going Private", 61 VA. L. REV. 1019, 1023 (1975).
229. Id. at 1019.
230. Borden, supra note 21, at 1015.
231. 380 A.2d at 977 n.7.
232. See Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145,
1161 (1932).
233. Vorenberg, supra note 135, at 1203. Some critics contend that it is the use of
shareholder equity to finance the going-private transaction which injures the public
shareholders; making the majority's gain to be "at the expense of the minority." Second
Circuit, supra note 13, at 1210. Still, it is clear that the minority cannot participate in a gain
which accrues only as the result of their elimination. Furthermore, insofar as the criticism
is directed to the fact that the public shareholder contributed more to the equity of the
corporation than he is now being offered, it would seem that a decline in stock market
prices is a risk inherent in investment.
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right of continued participation cannot be justified on the basis that it
prevents an injury not reflected in share valuation.2 34 Recognition of the
economic nature of the public shareholder's interest within the corpora-
tion, however, does not negate the increased possibility of abuse present
in going-private transactions.
Minority shareholders may sincerely question the fairness of going-
private terms which are unilaterally set by the majority.235 Still, it is
important to note that the unilateralnessof the majority's action is attribut-
able primarily to the doctrine of shareholder democracy. 236 It is elemen-
tary that shareholder democracy is not based on a "one-man-one-vote
principle, but on the proprietary principle of one-share-one-vote.''237
Thus, those with the largest financial stake in the corporation are given
the greatest amount of control in determining general corporate policy.
Consequently, any action by the minority which may enjoin or void a
merger authorized by statute 238 and approved by a majority should be
234. This viewpoint has been well described: "The rationale for this position has been
that minority shareholders who receive fair compensation cannot complain that the action
has worked to their detriment, and if they suffered no detriment, special advantage to
controlling shareholders is inconsequential." Establishing Federal Standards, supra note
37, at 656 (footnote omitted) (referring to Grimes v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc.,
392 F. Supp. 1393 (N.D. Fla. 1974)).
235. See note 204 supra. Borden dismisses the notion that the unilateralness of the
majority's action in fixing the stock price makes the going-private transaction inherently
unfair: "The unfairness, however, does not lie in the postulate that the price is necessarily
unfair because fixed by the insiders, an expression of the villain theory of corporate life
which we must dismiss as not justified by experience." Borden, supra note 21, at 1017.
236. Solomon explains the issue: "In response to the growing magnitude of corpora-
tions . . . and the possible nuisance value created by a recalcitrant minority, most state
legislatures empowered a majority of two-thirds of each class of shareholders to approve a
merger. This, in turn, opened the possibility for the victimization of the minority share-
holders." Solomon, supra note 47, at 156-57.
Although the majority shareholders appear to have the most powerful position in the
struggle, Borden notes that "it may be questioned how much of an advantage exists when
almost every going-private transaction to date has been met by a suit brought by a self-
appointed champion of the minority public shareholders." Borden, supra note 21, at 1017.
237. Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management in Modern Corpo-
rate Decisionmaking, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 44 (1969). Although hypothetically this means
that the majority may be only one shareholder, so might the minority. And, if judicial
policy must favor one above the other, the most logical choice is the majority shareholder
since he has invested a greater sum of money into the enterprise and thus should have a
greater voice in controlling its direction. Indeed, this is the reason that share democracy
rather than shareholder democracy was adopted. One commentator contends that
"[w]hile extending extraordinary protection to minority shareholders, [the Court's adop-
tion of the business purpose test] ignores the existence of the majority's interest in the
corporation and overlooks the fact that one of the risks assumed by every purchaser of a
corporation's stock is that his investment may be extinquished through events beyond his
control." Note, Second Circuit Note, 1975 Term, 51 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 417, 426 (1977)
(footnotes omitted) (referring to Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir.
1976), rev'd, 430 U.S. 462 (1977)).
238. Legislative intent concerning going-private transactions will, of course, vary from
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viewed with caution and handled with judicial restraint. 239 If it seems
inequitable that those who remain within the corporation are given the
power to exclude the minority, it seems equally inequitable to allow a
minority of shareholders to determine whether the corporation may go
private.24° Such a remedy merely replaces the self-serving will of the
majority with the similarly self-serving will of the minority. 241
It should also be noted that while the majority shareholders must have
a valid business purpose to consummate the transaction, the minority
need not have a comparable purpose for seeking to void the merger. And,
the notion that greed is not attributable solely to the majority shareholders
was apparent to at least one court:
The obverse of the minority claim, however, may well be that an
obdurate and obstructionist minority is engaged in a "hold-up" of
legitimate majority desires, motivated solely by greed for the top
dollar obtainable. The crime of "self-interest" is always attributable
to the other side. How the court reacts emotionally to a linguistic
barrage or to a sympathetic factual presentation should not be the
determinant. 242
Additionally, an element of unilateralness is unavoidable in going-
private transactions, since a corporation cannot attempt to go private
state to state. For a discussion of the legislative intent of the merger statutes in Delaware,
see notes 158-66 supra and accompanying text. A discussion of the legislative intent in
California is contained in notes 80 & 154 supra. Still, as Borden concludes: "Viewed
broadly, the social policy reflected in these statutes is a preference for corporate flexibili-
ty and corporate democracy over notions of vested shareholder rights." Borden, supra
note 21, at 1026.
239. In passing upon whether these additional requirements [of a valid business
purpose] are to be imported into the proceedings, the court at the outset must be wary
of acting precipitiously to upset [an appraisal] . . . procedure which has been given
express legislative sanction because of an emotional reaction or instinctive predisposi-
tion to sympathetic presentation. Skill in choosing appropriate semantic labels may
foreshadow the outcome. The claim of "freeze-out" by a predatory majority using
their power as insiders to mulct corporate funds and to overreach in order to unjustly
enrich themselves tends to lead a sympathetic court to look indulgently upon extra-
statutory remedies.
Tanzer Economic Assoc. v. Universal Food Specialties, Inc., 87 Misc. 2d 167, 175, 383
N.Y.S.2d 472, 479 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (footnote omitted).
240. See Borden, supra note 21, at 101,6. This is particularly true when a majority of the
minority approve the transaction since protection of the minority is not a convincing
rationale where the majority of the protected class approve the transaction. While requir-
ing approval by a majority of the minority might appear to be an attractive solution to this
judicial balancing of equities, the judicial imposition of such a voting requirement would
nevertheless appear to be an unacceptable usurpation of express legislative commands.
241. See Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283, 1308 (2d Cir. 1976) (dissenting
opinion), rev'd, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). Manning concludes that "[t]his concern for the
minority has a familiar and congenial ring to the American mind. It sounds of Madison's
warning that tyranny by the majority is more to be apprehended than tyranny by the few."
Manning, supra note 129, at 226.
242. Tanzer Economic Assoc. v. Universal Food Specialties, Inc., 87 Misc. 2d 167, 175,
383 N.Y.S.2d 472, 479 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
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without affecting the market liquidity of the issuer's stock. 243 As shares
are either repurchased by the corporation or tendered to the acquiring
company, the volume of shares available for public trading is reduced
and the marketability of such shares is correspondingly diminished.
24
Although methods of going private have been characterized as either
voluntary or involuntary,245 the distinction seems insubstantial. On the
one hand, tender offers are regarded as a voluntary method of going
private since the elimination of the public shareholders depends upon the
individual's election to terminate his participation in the enterprise. 246 In
contrast, the elimination of public shareholders through a merger is
regarded as an involuntary method of going private since the individual's
continued existence within the corporation is determined by a vote of the
statutorily mandated percentage of outstanding shares.247
Under either method, however, the element of coercion necessarily
exists. 248 The shareholder contemplating tendering his shares is certainly
influenced, and possibly compelled, by the prospect of deregistration
and/or delisting with a stock exchange which may render his securities
unmarketable.249 And, full disclosure of the company's future plans,
including the possibility of a freeze-out merger if the tender offer is not
completely successful, may only serve to increase the pressure on the
public shareholders to accept the tender offer.5
0
It is not surprising that this element of coercion, induced by the
prospect of a loss of market liquidity, has prompted some of the most
extreme criticisms of going-private transactions? 5 1 One commentator
suggests that the acquiring company should be required to insure a
market for the untendered shares.252 Although such a safeguard would
undoubtedly alleviate the amount of coercion'present in tender offers,
some coercion, engendered by the loss of publicly available information
on the company,25 will nevertheless remain.
243. Greene, supra note 73, at 515-16; Solomon, supra note 47, at 171.
244. Brudney, A Note on "Going Private", 61 VA. L. REV. 1019, 1020 (1975).
245. Establishing Federal Standards, supra note 37, at 649-50.
246. Id. at 649.
247. Id. at 650.
248. Id. at 649.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 649-50.
251. See Greene, supra note 73, at 516; Going Private, supra note 52, at 917-18.
252. Greene, supra note 73, at 516 (citing Brudney, A Note on "Going Private", 61 VA.
L. REV. 1019, 1043-44 (1975)). Greene also mentions the likelihood that "an investor who
purchased shares in a publicly held company will not be interested in remaining as an
investor in a private company in which he has no role in management." Greene, supra
note 73, at 516.
253. Swanson, The Elimination of Public Shareholders: Going Private, 7 CONN. L.
REV. 609, 610-11 nn.4-10, 616 & n.31 (1975).
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While the possibility of abuse is created by the inherently coercive
nature of going-private transactions, this possibility does not mandate the
imposition of restrictions on all such transactions.254 Public shareholders
should be protected when such abuses do occur. But, again, those
protections should not exceed the interest actually invaded, and thus
should be limited to the issue of fair valuation for the investor's shares.
V. CONCLUSION
Competing policy considerations have been advanced in the going-
private area.2 5 Corporate flexibility, a factor in the rejection of the
vested rights doctrine,1 6 continues to play a critical role in any con-
sideration of minority shareholder protections.257 The possibility of
shareholder litigation injects an element of uncertainty 258 and delay in
business transactions which may require prompt action.2 9 This is par-
ticularly true in the case of acquisition mergers. To the extent that pure
going-private transactions reflect a basic change in management ap-
proach and business orientation, 6° as they usually do, or a recapitaliza-
tion of the corporation26 there is a similar need for unretarded action.
An alternative policy consideration advanced is that public shareholder
protection in going-private transactions is necessary to prevent public
disillusionment with the stock market.2 62 Evidently, the view is that such
an unsettling experience with the corporation will adversely affect other
businesses attempting to obtain funds through the sale of stock to the
public. The actual extent of the effect that going-private transactions
have on investor confidence is unfortunately impossible to determine.
However, corporations have become increasingly independent of
funds obtained from individual investors. The percentage of total dollars
attributable to individual trading activity on the New York Stock Ex-
change has fallen by approximately fifty percent since 1961 to the current
low of twenty-three percent.2 63 The raising of funds through public
financing has evidently become less profitable to both the individual
254. In actuality, such abuse is rare. SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 389, at B-4 (Feb.
9, 1977).
255. Second Circuit, supra note 13, at 1206.
256. See Chicago Corp. v. Munds, 172 A. 452, 455 (Del. 1934); Gibson, supra note 215,
at 291.
257. See Gibson, supra note 215, at 291.
258. Vorenberg, supra note 135, at 1215.
259. See Gibson, supra note 215, at 295.
260. See notes 47-48 supra and accompanying text.
261. See notes 56-61 supra and accompanying text.
262. Second Circuit, supra note 13, at 1206; Establishing Federal Standards, supra
note 37, -at 649.
263. See note 51 supra.
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investor and the corporation due to the depressed state of the public
trading market.264 Moreover, the policy of promoting investor confidence
does not apply exclusively to the minority shareholders:
It should also be noted, of course, that controlling shareholders are
also shareholders, and that their continued willingness to put mas-
sive sums at risk during these turbulent times is an essential element
of the capital formation process. It is of even greater importance at a
time when many others are abandoning all but the most secure
equity investments.
265
Ultimately the validity of public shareholder protections which assume
a right of continued participation is a policy decision determined by
balancing the corporation's need for flexibility against the minority's
need for protection. Insofar as the public shareholders' interests and
expectations concerning the corporation are essentially monetary, and in
the absence of any substantial non-economic injury, the recognition of a
right of continued participation is unnecessary.
Additionally, since the protection offered to the public shareholders
serves only to impair corporate flexibility, the right of continued partici-
pation implicit in the business purpose test should be abandoned. Instead,
until such time as the public shareholders can demonstrate a non-
economic interest (or reasonable expectation) in the corporation, the
primary focus in going-private transactions should be whether the public
shareholders have received fair value for their shares. Consequently,
extra-valuation protections should be rejected, and the remedy for dis-
placed minority shareholders should be limited to fair valuation.
Lorraine Beth Johnson
264. Needham, Harper & Steers went private last July. The primary motivation for the
move was the "cold shoulder the firm was receiving from investors." Shakin, Going
Private: Court Rulings Have Sharply Raised the Ante, Barron's, Oct. 10, 1977, at 11, col.
1.
265. SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 389, at B-3 (Feb. 9, 1977).
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